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( ap er One 
---p f h p er 
Eminent domain is the right or power of the 
sovereign to ta ke private property for the pubLi c 
u se; to take ownership and  possession thereof upon 
payment of just compensation to the owner of the 
property.l It is an i n herent power of a sovereign, 
which is without limitation or restriction,  except for 
the constitutiona l  Limitations that private property 
must be taken for a publi c use,2 and the owner 
of such property must be paid j ust com pensation  
for the property.3 Although the  power o f  eminent 
domain is  an i n herent power of the sovereign, it lies 
dormant unti l the legislature declares the purpose 
for which it may be exercised, and the agencies that 
may use the power.4 The power of eminent domain 
may be exercised directly by the legislature by the 
adoption of a statute identifying the pa rticu lar 
property to be acqui red for a public use, or it may 
be delegated to agents who may exercise the power 
in the manner prescribed in  the enabLing statute.5 
The power of eminent domain has been 
deLegated to cou nties (Tennessee Code Annotated 
(T .LA.)  § 29-17-101; 29-17-801)6 and m unicipalities 
(T.LA. § 29-17-201; 29-17-801)7. The power of 
eminent domain has been generally delegated 
to any person or  corporation authorized by law 
to construct railroads, turn pi kes, canals, tolL 
bridges, roads, cau seways, or other work of internal  
• 
m 1n 
improvement (T.LA. § 29-16-101) .8 The Genera l  
Assembly has a lso delegated the power of  eminent 
domain to the foL lowi ng:9 
Ai rport authorities (T .LA. § 42-3-108-42-3-109;  
42-3-204) 
Beech River Watershed Development Authority 
(T.LA. § 64-1-102) 
Bri dge companies (T .LA. § 54-13-208) 
Carro l  County Watershed Authority 
(T.LA. § 64-1-805) 
Chickasaw Basi n Authority (T.LA. § 64-1-204) 
Coast and geodetic surveys (T .LA. § 29-17-501) 
Counties-Airports (T.LA. § 42-5-103) 
Counties-Electric plants (T.LA. § 7- 52-105) 
Counties-Contro LLed access highways 
(T.LA. § 54-16-104) 
Counties-Ferries (T.LA. § 54-11-302) 
Counties-Industria l  parks (T.LA. § 13-16-203)  
Counties-Levees (T.LA. § 69- 5-105) 
Counties-Public transportation systems 
(T.C.A . § 7-56-106) 
Counties-Public works projects (ToLA. § 9-21-107) 
Counties-Railroad systems (T.LAo § 7-56-207) 
Counties-Recreationa l  la nd (ToLA.  § 11-24-102) 
Counties-Roads (T.LA. § 29-17-801 et seq . ; 
54-10-205) 
Counties-Schoo ls (T.LA. § 49-6-2001 et seq. )  
Counties-Solid waste sites (ToC .A .  § 68-211-919)  
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Counties-for the West Ten nessee River Basin 
Authority (T.CA. § 64-1-1103 (14)) 
Drainage and levee  districts (T.LA. § 29-17-801 
et seq. ; 69-6-201 et seq. ) 
Electric power districts (T. LA. § 7-83-303; 
7-83-305) 
Hospitals (T. LA. § 29-16-126) 
(lLA. in certain counties) 
Housin g  authorities (T.CA. § 13-20-104; 
13-20-108-13-20-109; 13-20-212; 
29-17-401 et seq.) 
Light, power, a n d  heat companies 
(T. LA. § 65-22-101) 
Metropolitan governme nts-Energy production 
facilities (lC.A.  § 7-54-103) 
Metropolitan govern me nts-Port auth orities 
(T.CA. § 7-5-108) 
Metropolitan hospita l  authorities (T. CA. § 7-57-305) 
Mill Creek Flood Control Authority 
(lCA. § 64-3-104) 
Municipalities-Airports (T. CA. § 42-5-103) 
Municipalities-City Manager-Commission 
(T.LA.  § 6-19-101) 
Municipalities-Con trolled access highways 
(T.LA.  § 54-16-104) 
Municipalities-Drainage ditches (T.CA.  § 7-35-101) 
M unicipalities-ELectric pla nts (T. LA. § 7-52-105 ) 
Municipalities-Gas systems (T. CA. § 7-39-303) 
Municipalities-Ind ustrial parks (T. LA. § 13-16-203) 
Municipalities-Mayor - Aldermanic 
(T.LA. § 6-2-201) 
Munici palities-Modified City Manager 
(lLA. § 6-33-101) 
Municipalities-Parks (T. LA. § 7-31-107 et seq. ) 
Mu nicipalities-Pu blic tra nsportation systems 
(T. CA.  § 7-56-106) 
Municipalities-Publi c works projects 
(T. CA. § 9-21-107) 
Municipalities-Railroad systems (T. LA. § 7-56-207) 
Municipalities-Recreational systems 
(T.CA. § 11-24-102) 
Municipalities-Schools (T.CA. § 49-6-2001 et seq.) 
Municipalities-Sewers (T.CA. § 7-35-101) 
Municipalities-Slum clearan ce (lLA. § 13-21-204; 
13-21-206) (T.CA. in certain counties) 
Municipalities-Solid waste sites 
(T. CA. § 68-211-919) 
Municipalities-Streets (T.LA. § 7-31-107 et seq. ) 
Municipalities-Utilities (T.CA. § 7-34-101) 
Municipalities-Water systems (T. LA.  § 7-35-101) 
Municipalities-for the West Ten nessee River Basin 
Authority (T. CA. § 64 1-1103 (14)) 
North Central Tennessee Railroad Authority 
(T.LA. § 64-2-507) 
Pipeline  companies (T.CA. § 65-28-101) 
Private roads (lC.A .  § 54-14-101 et. seq. ) 
Public gristmills (lLA. § 43-23-103 et seq. ) 
Railroads (T.LA. § 65-6-109; 65-6-123) 
Railroad s-Branch li nes (T. CA . § 65-6-126 et seq. ) 
Railroads-Incline railroads (T.LA. § 65-18-101) 
Railroads-Interurban  railroads (T.LA. § 65-16-119) 
Road improveme nt districts (lLA. § 54-12-152) 
Solid waste authorities (lLA . § 68-211-908) 
State Department of Environ ment a n d  Con se rvation 
(lLA. § 11-1-105; 11-3-105; 11-14-110; 
59-8-215) 
State Departme nt  of Transportation 
(lLA . § 29-17-801 et seq. ; 54-5-104; 
54-5-208; 54-16-104) 
State military affairs (T.LA. § 58-1-501 et seq. ) 
State/Water a n d  sewer facilities (T�C.A.  § 12-1-109) 
Telegraph companies (T.CA. § 65-21-204) 
Telephone  companies (T. LA. § 65-21-204) 
Telephone  cooperatives (T.CA. § 65-29-104; 
65-29-125) 
Ten nessee Tollway Authority (T. CA.  § 54-15-120) 
Tri-County Railroad Authority (T. LA.  § 64-2-307) 
University of Ten nessee (T. CA.  § 29-17-301) 
Utility districts (T. CA. § 7-82-305) 
Water companies (lCA. § 65-27-101 et seq. ) 
Watershed districts (T.CA . § 69-7-118) 
Water and wastewater authorities 
(T.LA. § 68-221-610) 
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Such g rants of the power of eminent domain  are 
in derogation of private property rig hts and wi ll 
be strictly construed against the condemners a nd  
libera lly i n  favor o f  t he  rights of property owners .10 
Thus  the condemner's right to take property will be 
denied if the condem ner has failed to fo llow the 
procedu res set forth in the statutes that authorize 
exercise of the power of eminent domain. ll Also 
the condemner wi ll be precluded from acquiring 
a g reater interest i n  property than is authorized 
by statute .12 
T.LA. § 68-211-122 prohibits the u se by 
a m unicipality of the  power of eminent domain 
to establish a solid waste landfill outside its 
corporate boundaries unless this is approved by 
the  governing body of the area i n  which the Landfi ll 
is to be Located .  This approval  m ust be given by 
a majority vote at two (2) consecutive regu larly 
schedu led meetings. 
om in • 
The power of eminent domain, o r  the power to 
acquire private property for a public use, can 
genera lly be disti nguished from the poli ce power, 
which is the power to adopt regulations to 
prom ote the  pubLic health, safety and welfare of 
a com m unity, even  though the exercise of either 
power may i mpair the fair market value of private 
property. 13 Where the impairment of value results 
from the exercise of the police power, cou rts 
traditiona lly find that the loss is not subject to 
the just compe nsation requi rements of the United 
States and  Tennessee Constitutions.14 Thus, claims 
for com pensation have been denied where the va lue 
of property has been im paired as the resu lt of: the 
im position of housi ng regu lations ;15 the imposition 
of zoning regu lations; 16 the imposition of utility 
rate reg ulations ;17 the change in streets abutti ng 
property from two-way streets to one-way streets;18 
inconvenience, noise, and dirt from construction of 
a public im provement which i nterfered with the use 
of property;19 or  annexation in which city annexed 
service a rea of p rivate tra sh  haulers .20 
This theoreticaL distinction becomes b lurred when 
the police power regu lation im pairs the value or 
use of private property to such an extent that no 
beneficia l use of the property remains .21 These 
i nstances have become more com mon as local 
governments have im posed land use reg u Lations 
u pon  private property instea d  of usi ng  li mited 
pubLi c  funds to acquire private property for pub lic 
use. This prob lem was fi rst addressed i n  Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon,22 where Justice Holmes held 
that IIwhi le property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if  regu lation goes too far, it will be 
recognized as  a taki ng . . . (as) ... a strong pub lic  desi re 
to i mprove the pub li c  condition i s  not enough to 
warrant achievi ng the desi re by a shorte r cut than 
the constitutional  way of payi ng for the change." 
This holding has been a pp lied in Tennessee to 
a zoning regu lation that deprived the owne r  of 
the beneficia l  use of its property.23 Where such 
a IIregulatory taking" occurs, the property owner 
is entitled to recover lIjust com pensation" for the 
tak ing, not ju st the invali dation of the regu lation 
that resu lted i n  the taking .24 These issues wiLL be 
discussed in  further  detail in Chapter Five. 
s. nt l 
A gove rnmental defendant must perform 
a purposefu l or intentiona l  act for a taking to 
exist and a taking wil l  not result from unavoida ble 
i ncidents or negLigent acts.25 (But see 
T.C .A .  § 29-16-127). 
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Chapter T 0 
Condemnation Procedures 
n d 
There are a variety of condemnation procedures 
that have been established for municipalities 
and counties,1 but the most commonly utilized 
are the traditional "jury of view" procedure 
(T.CA. § 29-16-101 et seq.) and the "bulldozer/quick 
take" procedure (T.CA. § 29-17-801 et seq.). These 
statutory provisions normally permit the condemner 
to select the procedure of its choice from the 
available options.2 This manual will discuss only 
the traditionallljury of view" procedure and the 
J1bulldozer/quick take" procedure, since the same 
principles are generally applicable to the other 
procedural schemes available to counties 
and municipalities. 
T.CA. § 6-54-122 establishes special procedures 
to be followed by a municipality in taking 
unincorporated property in any county in 
which the municipality was not located before 
May 1, 1995. The municipality must notify the 
county in writing and the county must approve 
the taking. The county's disapproval may not be 
arbitrary or capricious and may be reviewed by 
statutory writ of certiorari. These provisions do 
not apply to takings necessary to provide utility 
service, certain takings by metropolitan govern­
ments, or takings relative to airports or projects 
sponsored jointly by a municipality and county. 
The condemner seeking to acquire an interest under 
the power of eminent domain must first file 
a lawsuit to accomplish this objective. In the 
lawsuit, the court will be presented with two issues: 
(1) whether the condemner has the right to take the 
property;3 and (2) the amount of just compensation 
to which the property owner is entitled.4 
Under the "jury of view" and the "buLLdozer/quick 
take" procedures, the condemnation action must 
be filed in the circuit court in which the property 
is located (T.CA. § 29-16-104; 29-17-802). Thus, 
the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
eminent domain proceedings.5 Once condemnation 
proceedings have been filed in the circuit court, the 
court may resolve matters that are incidental to the 
condemnation case, such as contract6 or boundary7 
disputes involving the condemned property. The 
only exception to this rule involves cases that 
were properly brought in chancery court to obtain 
injunctions or other equitable relief.8 The chancery 
court has been found to have jurisdiction to 
award appropriate relief under the eminent domain 
statutes in cases that were initially brought to 
obtain injunctive relief,9 or to void a contract10 or 
reform a deed.ll 
re 
The jury of view procedure requires the condemner 
to initiate the condemnation action by filing 
a petition for condemnation in the circuit court and 
giving the property owner notice of the proceedings 
(T.CA. § 29-16-104-29-16-105). The circuit court 
then appoints a jury of view to examine the 
property to be condemned and determine the 
amount of just compensation to which the property 
owner is entitled (T.CA. § 29-16-107-29-16-113). 
The jury of view will then file its report with the 
court, and the report may be confirmed or it may 
be excepted to and/or appealed from by one or 
both the parties that have objections to the report 
(T.CA. § 29-16-115-29-16-118). 
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If the report is confi rmed, an  order will be entered 
conveying the property to the condemner upon 
payment to the property owner the amount of 
just com pensation set by the jury of view 
(T.LA. § 29-16-116 ) . If an exception is fi led, the 
court may upon a showing of good cause appoint 
a new jury of view (T.LA. § 29-16-117) . If an 
appeal is filed to the report, the circuit court 
conducts a tri a l  de novo before a petit jury 
(T.LA . § 29-16-118) . 
Petiti r e a i n 
The petition for condemnation must be fi led i n  
the county in which the property is located 
(T.LA.  § 29-16-104) . The petition must name 
as  defendants a ll parties having any interest in 
a ny way in the property being acquired 
(T.LA. § 29-16-106). All parties must be named 
as defendants for the con demnation proceedings 
to bin d the parties, with the exception of unborn 
remaindermen, who a re bound if al l  livi n g  parties 
in interest are parties (T.LA . § 29-16-106} .12 
Thus, to obtain clear title to the property, the 
condemner should name as  defendants the spouse 
of the property owner,13 a ny person owning a life 
estate or reversi onary or remainder interest in the 
property,14 any lessee of the property,15 any holder 
of a recorded mortgage.,16 and any holder of a ny 
other interest in the property, including a purchase 
contract of which the condemner  is aware.17 The 
name a nd  residence addresses of a ll defendants, if 
known,  should be listed in the petition a nd  if the 
name or address is unknown, that fact shou ld be 
stated in the petition (T.LA. § 29-16-104) . 
The body of the petition for condemnation shou ld 
set forth the statute, private act, or cha rter 
p rovision giving the condemner the genera l  power 
to acquire property by eminent domain and shou ld 
cite the "ju ry of view" statutes as  the specific 
statutory p rocedure being used by the condemner 
to acquire the property in question .ls The petition 
shou ld a lso identify the specific ordinance or 
resolution of the county or municipal  legislative 
body authorizin g the acquisition of the property 
under the power of eminent domai n .  
The nature o f  t he  project for which the property 
is being acquired sh ould be described 
(T.LA. § 29-16-104) . The petition  shou ld recite 
that the project is for a public use, is in the public 
interest, a nd  that the acquisition of the defendant's 
property is n ecessary for the completion of the 
project. 19 The particular interest in the property, 
either a fee interest or an easement, shou ld be 
identified (T.LA. § 29-16-104) . An accurate legal  
description  of the property shou ld be included, 
a long with a corresponding map or plat attached as 
an exhibit if  availab le (T.LA . § 29-16-104). 20 Also 
any known encumbrances upon the property shou ld 
be specified .  Fina l ly the petition should contain 
a prayer that a copy of the petition be served on 
defendants and a suitable portion of the land  or 
the rights of the defendants be awarded to the 
condemner  (T.LA . § 29-16-104) . 
The condemner  using the IIjury of view" procedure 
has the option of depositin g with the clerk of 
the court at the time the petition is fi led the 
amount it determines the property owner is 
entitled to for the property being acquired 
(T.LA . § 29-17-701) . The property owner may, 
upon written notice to the clerk of the court, 
withdraw thi s amount upon agreeing to refund 
any difference if the final award is less than the 
deposit (T.LA. § 29-17-701). Upon making a deposit, 
the condemner is re lieved from paying interest to 
the property owner on the amount deposited from 
the date of the taking unti l the date of the ultim ate 
award to the property owner (T.LA. § 29-17-701) . 
Thus, the statute provides the con demner with 
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a mechanism to  avoi d  th e paym ent of i nterest on 
the am ou nt deposited whil e permitt ing th e pr oper ty 
ow ner t o  imm ediately obt ain the am ou nt deposited 
to repl ac e th e p roperty  t ak en by th e condem ner.21 
Th e condem ner sh oul d m ak e  a g ood f ai th estim at e 
of th e dam ag es and expenses th e pr operty ow ner 
will likely incu r wh en it determ ines th e am ou nt 
to deposit .22 Th e am ou nt of th e deposit sh oul d b e  
spec ifi ed in  th e condem nati on peti tion. Th e am ou nt 
of th e deposit  is not r el evant to th e tri al23 and th e 
condem ner c an offer pr oof th at the p roperty i s  of 
l esser valu e.24 
Notic e of th e fil i ng  of th e condem nati on petit ion  
must be gi ven to  all def endant s, or i f  th e def endant 
is a nonr esi dent of th e c ou nt y, to th e def endant' s 
agent ,  at l east five days befor e  th e petit ion  for 
c ondem n ati on i s  presented t o  th e court for i ssu anc e  
of the writ of i nqu iry (T.LA. § 29-16-105). I f  th e 
defenda nt' s  nam e  or address is u nknow n  and not 
readily  asc er tai nable, notic e sh oul d b e  given by 
public at ion as provi ded in T.LA. § 21-1-204 f or 
suit s i n  ch ancery c ourt (T.CA. § 29-16-105).25 
Alth ough notic e by public ati on is al so auth oriz ed 
for nonresident s  of th e st at e, th e du e pr ocess 
cl au se of th e Four teenth Am endm ent to th e U nit ed 
St ates C onstitut ion requ i res m ore th an notice  
by pubLic ati on wh en th e name and addr ess of 
a nonr esi dent def endant  i s  k now n or very easily 
ascertainabl e.26 Th e notic e sh oul d advi se the 
defendant of th e fili ng of th e pet ition  and th e date  
sch edul ed for th e present ation of  th e peti ti on to  
th e c ou rt f or i ssu anc e  of  th e w rit of  i nqu ir y.27 
Th e notic e of th e fil ing of th e petiti on i s  i n  li eu 
of th e summ ons wh ich i s  norm all y i ssu ed i n  c ivil 
ac ti ons.28 Th e m anner of servic e of th e notice  is not 
specifi ed in  the applic abl e st atut es; however ,  
RuLe 71 of th e Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 
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provi des th at th ose rules will be applic abl e t o  
th e extent th ey are not i n  c onfl ic t  with or do 
not cont radict or c ont ravene th e pr ovi si ons  of 
th e applic abl e statut es. Th er efo re, ser vic e of th e 
notice, acc omp anied by a copy of the petiti on for 
condem nation ,  c an b e  acc om pl ish ed i n  any m anner 
auth or iz ed by Rul e 4 of th e Tennessee Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A retur n of th e notice, l i ke a r etur n of 
a summ ons, sh oul d be c om pl eted i n  c om pli anc e  with 
RuLe  4.03 of th e Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At th e t im e  of th e presentati on of th e petiti on t o  
th e cou rt f o r th e issu ance  o f  th e writ of inquir y, 
which c annot occur u ntil five (5) days aft er  th e 
def endant has  been g iven notic e of th e fili ng of th e 
petiti on, th e condem ner sh oul d subm it a m otion to  
su st ain  th e condem ner' s  right to  tak e  th e pr operty  
u n der th e power of emi nent dom ain .  Th is  m oti on 
ask s  th e cour t t o  issue  th e w rit of inquir y and fi x  
a tim e and pl ac e for th e i nqu est . Any ch alL enge t o  
th e condem ner' s  right to  t ak e  mu st b e  asser ted at 
thi s st ag e of th e pr oceedi ng s .29 
I f  no ch alL eng e  to th e c ondem ner' s right to take  
i s  made, th e c our t w ill su st ai n th e c ondem nation 
p roceedi ngs and order th e i ssu ance  of th e w rit of 
inqui ry of dam ag es (T.CA. § 29-16-107). Thi s or der 
sh ould r ec ite th at: th e pet it ion f or con dem nat ion 
h as b een pr operly filed and notic e g iven t o  th e 
defendant s; th e c ondem ner has th e r ight t o  acqui re 
the pr operty as discl osed i n  th e or der ;  th e cl erk 
sh ould issue  a writ of i nqui ry to appear on a fi xed 
date and pl ac e and th at no furth er not ic e  w ill be 
gi ven ;  u pon sel ec tion  of th e ju ry of view th e ju ry 
will proc eed t o  th e prop er ty, exami ne th e sam e  and 
h ear t estim ony of  wit nesses, but no arg um ent of 
c ou nsel ,  and will set apar t  by m etes and b ou nds th e 
pr oper ty t o  be condem ned and  assess th e dam ages 
as  requi red by l aw ;  and th at th e j ur y  of vi ew w ill 
r educ e i ts r eport t o  wr it i ng  and  deli ver it to  the 
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sheriff, who wil l return it to the court .3D If the 
defendant challenges the condemner's right to 
take, the court must first resolve this cha llenge 
before it m ay order  issuance of the writ of inqui ry 
(T.LA. § 29-16-107) .31 If the court finds that the 
condemner has the rig ht to take the p roperty, it 
wi ll sustain the condem nation proceedings and 
o rder issuance of the writ of inquiry of damages 
(T.LA. § 29-16-107) . The order d i recting the 
issuance of the writ of i nqui ry is not a fina l order 
and therefore is not appealab le .32 
The writ of inquiry is issued by the clerk and 
d i rected to the sheriff, commanding hi m to summ on 
a panel of ju rors to appear on a fixed date and  
p lace (T.LA. § 29-16-107) .33 The  sheriff thereafter 
sum mons a panel of 12 to 15 potentia l  ju rors 
from which the jury of view will be se lected .  The 
sheriff should return the writ to the c lerk of court, 
specifying the names of the persons on whom the 
writ of inqui ry was served .34 
The ju ry of view will consist of five persons, 
unless the parties agree to a different number  
(T.LA . § 29-16-108) . The jurors m ust possess the  
sam e  qualificati ons as ju rors in  other civi l cases, 
with the additiona l  qua lification that no members 
of the ju ry of view may have an i nterest in  
a si mi lar case (T.LA.  § 29-16-109 ) . The ju rors may 
be cha llenged for cause or peremptori ly as in  any 
other civil case (T.LA. § 29-16-108) . In the instance 
where the name of the ju ror is se lected by the 
cou rt, and  the j uror is unab le to attend, the sheri ff 
wi l l  se lect a replacement (T.LA. § 29-16-110) . 
If the date has not been set by the cou rt, 
the sheriff must give the parties three days' 
notice of the time  and place of the inqui ry 
(T.LA. § 29-16-111) . 35 On the date and tim e  
specified, the jury wi ll b e  selected (if the names 
of the ju rors are not specified by the court o r  the 
pa rties) and sworn to fai r ly and im pa rtia lly, without 
favor or affectation,  lay off by metes and bounds 
the property required for the proposed improvement 
and  to assess the damages to the landowner 
(T.LA. § 29-16-112) . 
The jury m ay then receive brief instructions from 
the court on its duties, whi ch a re to go onto the 
property, examine the sa me, to hear testimony 
of witnesses but no arguments of counsel, to 
assess the damages and prepare a report i n  
writi ng and deliver it to the sheriff.36 The ju ry 
of view wiLL then be p laced in the charge of the 
sheriff and wil l  p roceed to examine the property 
(T.LA. § 29-16-113) . The parties and thei r counsel 
may accom pany the ju ry of view to the property and 
put on evidence as to  its va lue, but  counsel are not 
perm itted to make arguments to the jury of view 
(T.LA. § 29-16-113 ) .37 After the investigation of the 
property and the testimony has been completed, the 
jury of view must identify by metes and bounds the 
property required fo r the proposed project and m ust 
assess damages to the landowner according 
to the princi ples discussed in Chapte r Four  
(T.LA . § 29-16-113 ) .  The decision of  the jury of  
view m ay be a majority instead of  a unani mous 
decision (T.LA . § 29-16-115) .38 The decision shou ld 
be reduced to writing and the  report m ust include 
a legal  descri ption of the property and the a mount 
of the award,  and be signed by a majority of 
the jurors.39 
The report should be delivered to the sheriff 
who returns the report to the court 
(T.LA. § 29-16-115). If the parties do not object 
to the report, it is confirmed by the court upon 
motion by the condemne r.4D The court then 
enters an order confirming the report 
(T.LA. § 29-16-116) . This o rder sh ould incorporate 
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the report of the jury of view, should order that 
the property be divested from defendants and 
vested in the condemner, and further order that the 
condemner pay the defendants the amount specified 
in the report.41 The order should also specifically 
provide for the issuance of a writ of possession to 
put the condemner in possession, if necessary.42 
If there is no dispute as to the proper distribution 
of the funds to defendants, the order should 
specify such distribution, otherwise the court 
must retain jurisdiction to permit the defendants 
to present proof on their respective interests and 
the proper disposition of the award.43 This order 
should also adjudge the costs of the case (normally 
against condemner) and provide for payment of the 
members of the jury of view.44 The maximum amount 
of this payment is specified at T.CA. § 29-16-125. 
Either party may file exceptions to the report of 
the jury of view, and for good cause shown, the 
court may set aside the report of the jury of view 
and issue a new writ of inquiry for a new jury of 
view (T.CA. § 29-16-117) . Exceptions to the report 
of the jury of view should be directed toward some 
irregularity in the proceedings, misconduct of 
the jury of view, or where the report is founded 
on erroneous principles.45 The court considers 
the exceptions based on the proof in the record, 
and therefore an exception on the grounds of 
inadequacy of the damages would normally be 
insufficient.46 Although no time period is specified 
for the filing of the exceptions, the appeal from 
the report of the jury of view must follow the 
disposition of such exceptions,47 and such an appeal 
must be filed within forty-five (45) days of the 
confirmation of the report of the jury of view 
(T.CA. § 29-16-118) . It is therefore conceivable that 
a court would find that exceptions must be filed and 
disposed of prior to the expiration of the forty-five 
(45) day period. 
An appeal is the proper remedy if a party objects 
to the amount of damages awarded by the jury of 
view.48 The remedies of exception and appeal are 
cumulative and successive. A party may file an 
appeal regardless of whether exceptions have 
been filed.50 Either party may file an appeal 
within forty-five (45) days of the entry of the 
order confirming the report of the jury of view, 
and upon giving security for costs, and obtain 
a trial de novo before a jury as in any civil case 
(T.CA. § 29-16-118) . 
The condemner who obtained possession under 
the order confirming the report of the jury of 
view51 may continue in possession upon filing of 
an appeal by posting a bond, payable to defendants, 
in double the amount of the award of the jury 
of view, conditioned upon the condemner's 
compliance with the final judgment in the case 
(T.CA. § 29-16-120; 29-16-122) .52 Costs on appeal 
must be paid by the appealing party in all cases 
where the petit jury affirms the award of the jury 
of view or is more unfavorable to the appealing 
party (T.CA. § 29-17-119). In all other cases the 
court may award costs as in other chancery cases 
(T.CA. § 29-16-119). 
The condemner may take a voluntary nonsuit under 
Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 
in a condemnation case.53 A nonsuit cannot be 
taken after the condemner has taken possession 
of the property after the confirmation of the 
report of the jury of view, leaving nothing to be 
determined except the amount of compensation 
due the defendant.54 
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The bu lldozer/quick take procedure can be used by 
the state of Tennessee for acquisition of such right­
of-way, land ,  materia l, easements and  rights as are 
necessary, suitab le o r  desi rab le for the construction, 
reconstruction, maintenance, repair, drainage or 
protection of any street, road, freeway or parkway 
(T.CA. § 29-17-801) . In additi on to these purposes, 
municipalities and  counties can use the bu lldozer/ 
quick take procedure for any municipa l o r  county 
purpose for which condemnation is otherwise 
authorized by any act of the Tennessee Genera l 
Assem bly, u n less exp ressly stated to the contrary 
(T.CA. § 29-17-801) . Levee and  dra inage districts in 
certain counties m ay a lso use the bu lldozer/quick 
take procedure (T.CA. § 29-17-801) . The bulldozer/ 
quick ta ke procedure may not be used by housing 
authorities since they are not counties 
or mu nicipalities.55 
The bu lldozer/quick take procedure is a cumu lative 
and  supplementary p rocedure for the exercise of 
eminent dom ain and should be construed in pari 
materia with the other eminent domain statutes.56 
This supplementary procedu re was designed to 
p rotect the property owner by having the amount 
the  condemner be lieves the property owner is 
entitled to deposited in court, and when that money 
has been deposited, to give the condemner  the 
a lmost i m mediate right of possession .57 
The bu lldozer/quick ta ke procedure, li ke the jury of 
view procedure, requi res the condemner to initiate 
the condemnation action by filing a petition fo r 
condem nation in the circuit court, accompanied by 
a deposit for the amount of damages the condemner 
believes the property owner is entitled to, and 
giving the property owner notice of the proceedings 
(T.CA . § 29-17-802; 29-17-803) . If the condemner 
is a m unicipality or county, any defendant may 
elect to use the jury of view procedure by fi ling 
a statement to that effect within five days of 
service upon the defendant (T.CA. § 29-17-801) .58 
If the condemner's right to ta ke is not questioned,59 
the condem ner may ta ke possession of the p roperty 
five days after the notice has been given 
(T.CA. § 29-17-803) .60 If the property owner is 
satisfied with the amount of the deposit, he or she 
may withdraw that amount from the court by filing 
a sworn statement stati ng that he or she is 
the owner of the property or property interests 
described in the petition for the condemnation 
and that he or she accepts the deposit in fu ll 
settlem ent for the taking of the property and a ll 
damages occasioned to the remainder  thereof 
(T.CA. § 29-17-804) . The court wi ll then enter an 
order divesting the property owner of title and 
vesting it in the condemner  (T.CA. § 29-17-804) . 
If the  property owner is dissatisfied with the 
deposit, he or she may fi le an exception to the 
amount deposited by the condemner, and  then 
a tria l before a petit jury may be held on the 
amount of just compensation due the p roperty 
owner (T.CA . § 29-17-805) . 
In addition to the req uirements for the petition 
for condemnation discussed under the jury of view 
procedure, the petition for condemnation under the 
bu lldozer/quick take procedure m ust identify the 
civil district in which the  property is located, 
a description of the p roject to be constructed, 
and the amount of damages to which the 
condemner has determined that the landowner 
wi ll be entit led (T.CA . § 29-17-803) . Although the 
interests of the defendants need not be specified 
(T.LA. § 29-17-803) , the condemner may specify 
the  interests of different defendants .61 
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If any person wh o is a proper party defendant  is 
omitted from the petition  for condemnation,  the  
condemner may file amendments to  add them 
(T.LA . § 29-17-809). 
As with the jury of vi ew procedure, notice of the 
filin g  of the condemnation proceeding must be 
given to al l  defendants (T.LA . § 29-17-803). This 
notice must be given at Lea st five days before 
any additionaL steps are take n in the case by the 
condemn er (lLA. § 29-17-803). The constitutional 
limitations on service by publication that were 
discussed under  the  ju ry of view procedure apply to 
the b ulldozer/quic k  take procedure.  Service of the 
notice, accompanied by a copy of the petition for 
condemnati on, can be accomplished in any man ner 
authorized by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The condemner must determine what  it deems 
to be the amount due the property owner  and 
deposit that amount when it fiLes the petition for 
condemnation.62 This  deposit sh ould be a good faith 
estimate of damages a n d  expen ses the defendant 
wiLL li kely incur a s  the resuLt of the condemnation.63 
Evidence of the amount deposited is irrelevant, 
however, if the condemnation goes to trial on the 
amount of damages.63A 
If the property owner  does not appear  and accept 
the amoun t of the deposit or ta ke exception to the 
amount of the deposit, the court can enter a default 
judgmen t  against the property owner. The court 
will then hold a hearing upon  the record a n d ,  in 
the  absence of the property owner, determine the 
amo u nt of just compen sation to whi ch the property 
owner is entitled (T.LA. § 29-17-807). 
t n 
If the defe n dant is satisfied with the amount of 
the damages, he or she may file a sworn statement 
verifyi n g  that he or she is the owner of the property 
or property rights being con demned a n d  he or she 
accepts the d eposit a s  a fulL settLement  for the 
taki n g  of the property sought to b e  acquired by 
the condemner  and any incidental damage s  to 
the remaind er of the property of the defendant 
(T.LA . § 29-17-804). The  court will the reafter 
enter a final judgment divesting the property 
owner of title and vesti n g  title in the condemner 
(T.LA . § 29-17-804). If the condemner i dentifies the 
amount of the deposit that should be aLlocated to 
the variou s  defendants, a defendant may accept that  
amount in full settLement of  his or  her interest. 64 
E",."'·· .. • T i 
If the property owner is dissatisfied with the 
amount deposited, he or she may file an exceptio n  
(lLA. § 29-17-805). The statute requires the filing 
of the exceptio n  on or before the second day of 
the next term of court (T.LA. § 29-17-805), b ut 
terms of court have been abolished in Tennessee 
( T.LA. § 16-2-510). Rule 71 of the Tennessee Rules of 
Civil Procedure may permit the filing of the exception 
in the same man ner  as an answe r in any c ivil case,  
which must be filed withi n 30 days of service of  the 
notice u n der  Rule 12.01 of the Tennessee Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
If the property owner fiLes an exception to the 
a mount deposited by the condemner, a trial  may 
be held before the petit jury as i n  oth er civi l  cases 
(T. LA. § 29-17-805). To obtain such a jury trial, 
the property owner should make a demand  for 
a jury u n der RuLe 38.02 of the Tennessee Rules of 
Civil Procedure, or file a motion for a jury trial u nder 
RuLe 39.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.65 
The tri al will be Limited to th e determination of 
the amount  of compen sation  to be paid  to the 
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defendant for the property or property rig hts ta ken. 
When adverse claims by mu ltipLe defendants are 
made for compensation,  the court and jury must 
also resoLve those clai ms (T.CA. § 29-17-808) . 
The defendant who has fi led an exception is entitLed 
to withd raw, prior to tria l, the amount deposited by 
the condemner without prejudice to the rig hts of 
either party (T.CA.  § 29-17-806) . 66 To withd raw the 
deposit, the defendant m ust make a written request 
to the clerk in which he or she agrees to refu nd the 
difference between the amount of the deposit and 
the final  award if the final award is less than the 
amount of  the deposit (T .CA. § 29-17-806) . 
If the fina l  award i s  less than or equaL to the 
amount of the deposit, the defendant must pay 
the costs of the trial  (T .CA. § 29-17-812) . Rule 
54.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs the taxing of any additiona l  costs. In other 
ca ses, the condemner i s  responsible fo r the payment 
of costs (T.C A. § 29-17-812) . 
S 
As with the jury of view p rocedure, the condemner 
may take a vo luntary nonsuit prior to obtaining 
possession to the property of the defendant.67 
However, if the condemner abandons the 
proceedin gs, the court may order the condemner  
to  pay defendants for a ll rea sonabLe costs, 
including reasonable attorney, appraisal and 
engineering fees actually incurred because of the 
condemnation proceedings (T .CA.  § 29-17-812) . 
An abandonment occurs when the condemner 
vo luntari ly g ives u p  the i ntended condemnation 
or declines to carry the condemnation proceedi ngs 
throug h to a conclusi on.68 
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Condemnation cases are of a dual nature, the first 
part involving the determination of the condemner's 
right to take the property, and the second part 
involving the amount of damages to which the 
property owner is entitled, provided the right to 
take exists.1 
Each condemner must satisfy a three-part test in 
order to have the right to take private property 
under the power of eminent domain. The first part 
of the test is the authority of the condemner to 
use the power of eminent domain. The second part 
of the test is whether the private property being 
taken will be put to a public use by the condemner. 
The third part is whether the private property is 
necessary for the accomplishment of the public use. 
As noted in Chapter One, the Tennessee General 
Assembly has by statute or private act authorized 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by 
a wide variety of governmental agencies and public 
service corporations. However, for the condemner to 
have the right to take a specific piece of property, 
the entity with the power of eminent domain must 
determine that the particular property being taken 
will be put to a public use and that the particular 
property is necessary for that use. Such action by 
the entity is essential not only to show that the 
condemnation proceedings are properly authorized, 
but as discussed further below, to eliminate any 
challenge by the property owner regarding the 
necessity for the taking of his or her property. 
The municipal or county condemner normally 
authorizes the acquisition of property under the 
t a 
power of eminent domain through the adoption 
of an ordinance or resolution that authorizes 
the acquisition of certain parcels of property for 
a specified municipal or county project.2 If an 
ordinance is required, a resolution will not do.2A 
Such an ordinance or resolution should : set out 
the nature of the project being undertaken; recite 
that the taking is for public use and in the public 
interest; and state that the acquisition of the 
particular properties identified is necessary for 
that purpose. 3 The ordinance or resolution should 
specifically authorize the filing of condemnation 
proceedings to acquire the properties identified. 4 
There must be strict compliance with all applicable 
charter provisions, statutes or private acts regarding 
the adoption of ordinances or resolutions, because 
failure to comply will result in the condemner 
lacking the authority to condemn the property 
identified in the ordinance or resolution.5 Also if the 
applicable statutory provisions impose preconditions 
to the filing of condemnation proceedings, such as 
the publication of notices, the preconditions must 
be met for the condemner to have the authority to 
institute condemnation proceedings.6 
A copy of the ordinance or resolution may be 
attached to the petition for condemnation,? or 
referenced by ordinance number in the body of 
the petition. If the right to take is challenged, 
a certified copy of the ordinance or resolution 
may be introduced into evidence to establish that 
the condemner has the authority to take 
the property in question. 
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The term "pub lic use" i s  i ncapable of a p recise and  
universa lly acceptab le definition .s The determination 
of whether a proposed use constitutes a publi c  use 
must be based on  the facts of each case, because 
the term m ust remain  e lasti c to meet the g rowi ng 
needs of  a complex society.9 
As noted above, the legislative body makes the  
initia l  determi nation that  the taking  of  private 
property is for a pub lic use. If the p roperty owner 
challenges the condemner's rig ht to take on the 
g rounds  that the p roperty will not be put to 
a pub lic use, the  court has the right and  the duty 
to determine whether the proposed use is a pub lic 
use. 10 The  determination by the legislative body 
that the p roposed use is a public use is entitled to 
a strong presumption of correctness,l1 but it is not 
con clu sive on the  court.12 When the cou rt finds  that 
the p roposed use has no sig nificant re lationshi p to 
the pub li c  benefit, it  m ust find  that the condemner  
lacks the r ight to take private property u nder  the 
power of  eminent domai n .13 
The various decisions by the courts on whether 
a p roposed use is a pub lic use have been 
categorized i nto two categories :  cases i n  which the 
cou rts used a narrow view of the scope of pub li c  
uses  and  cases in  wh ich  courts used  a broad view 
of the scope of pub lic u ses .14 Courts usi ng  the  
narrow view requi re that the pub lic m ust be entitled 
as  of  rig ht to directly use or enjoy the p roperty 
taken .15 U nder the broad view, the condemnation 
of the property need be on ly for the pub lic benefit 
or common good .16 U nder either view, it is not 
essentia l  that the enti re com mu nity directly enjoy 
or partici pate i n  the proposed use for the  court to 
find  a pub lic use. 17 Thus  the extension of uti lity 
service to serve a si ng le customer  who has  the rig ht 
to service from the uti lity may constitute a pub li c  
use that  j ustifies the condemnation of  easements 
necessary for the construction of the uti lity li ne . 18 
In determinin g  whether a p roposed use constitutes 
a public use, the cou rts a lso consider whether the 
condemner i s  a public or private entity. For the 
purpose of this ana lysis courts have recognized that 
there a re at least th ree categories of condemners : 
governmental entities; pub lic service corporations 
regu lated by the state ; and  private i ndividua ls o r  
corporations, a nd  the stan dard s  for pub li c  use wil l  
differ for each category.19 
If the condemner  is a governmenta l entity, the 
courts determine whether the pub li c  wou ld be 
entitled to receive and enjoy the benefits of the 
proposed use.20 The genera l  pub lic need not have 
access to the property to satisfy this requi rement.  2 1  
Acquiri ng property as a part of  a redevelopment 
p lan  under which the p roperty wil l  be subsequently 
resold to a private developer does not resu lt in  the 
property bei ng  acqui red for a private pu rpose when 
the pub lic receives a benefit from the com p lete 
imp lementation of the redevelopment p lan . 22 
Where the condemner is a pub lic service corporation 
regulated by the state, the court m ust determine 
whether  the pub li c  wi ll be g iven an  opportunity 
to make use of the service provided by the pub lic 
service corporation at reasonable rates and  
without discri mination .23 The  p roposed u se  m ust 
satisfy a pub lic demand  for faci lities for travel or  
transportation of inte lligence o r  com modities, and 
the general  pub lic, under  reasonable regu lations, 
must have a definite and  fixed use of the services of 
the condem ner in dependent of the will of 
the condemner. 24 
If the condemner is a private corporation o r  
i n dividual, the courts wi ll ra rely find  that the  
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proposed use is a pub li c  use. If the proposed use i s  
a bso lutely necessary to permit t he  private i ndivid ual  
or corporation to discharge duties owed to the 
public, a public use may be found .25 Otherwise the 
court wi ll require the condemner to establish that 
the general  public  will be entitled to make a fixed 
and definite use of the property bei ng  condem ned, 
i ndependent of the wi ll of the condemner. 26 
The fo llowi ng have been found  to constitute publi c  
uses when  the  condemner was a governmenta l 
entity :  munic ipal  streets,27 street lig hts,28 county 
roads,29 bridges, 3o sewers, 31 uti lity faci lities and  
office buHdi ngs,32 waterworks, 33 cemeteries, 34 go lf 
cou rses,35 parks, 36 g reenbelts, 3 7 slum clearance 
projects,38 redeve lopment projects, 39 and  easements 
across rai lroad  right of ways .40 
The followi ng  have been found  to constitute publi c  
uses when  the  condemner was  not a govern menta l 
enti ty :  rai lroad tra cks and terminal  faci liti es,41 
te lephone Li nes and  underg round fiber optic cables,42 
g rist mi lls,43 i ron  works,44 electri c power faci lities,45 
private ly owned turnpi kes,46 flumes,47 te legraph li nes 
and poles,48 private water lines,49 and microwave 
re lay towers. 50 
P roperty that is devoted to a pub lic use cannot 
be condem ned for another public useS1 i n  the 
absence of legis lative authority permitti ng the 
condemner to take property a lready devoted to 
a public use. 52 The regu lation of land uses under 
the poli ce power, however, does not result in  the 
property being  devoted to a public use that would 
preclude condem nation . 53 
Un li ke the review of the legis lative body's 
determination of public use, the court provides on ly 
a li mited review of the necessity or  experience of 
the tak ing of any parti cular parcel of property. The 
legis lative body's determination  of necessity 
is conclusive upon the courts i n  the absence of 
a showi ng of fraudulent or a rbitra ry and capri ci ous 
a ction by the condem ner.54 
Arbitrary and capricious  a ctions  are wi llfu l and 
un reasonab le actions taken without consideration 
or  in  di sregard of the facts existi ng  at the time 
the condem nation was decided upon or withi n the 
foreseeable future . 55 An action is not a rbitrary and  
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due 
consideration, where there i s  room for two opi nions, 
even if the court believes that the condemner erred 
in basing  its decisi on on one of the two opi nions . 56 
Thus, the property owner cannot ask the court to 
substitute its judg ment for that of the condemner 
on what i s  in the best i nterest of the public .  5 7  The 
court can not substi tute its judgment on the proper 
parcel of property to be taken, as disti nguished 
from simi lar property in  the same area, o r  determi ne 
the suitabi lity of a parti cular parcel of property for 
the proposed use, or decide the quantity of property 
required by the condemner for the proposed use. 58 
The propriety of the condemner acqui ri ng prope rty 
for expected futu re needs has never been addressed 
by a Tennessee court, but other courts have found 
that the ti me of  the  taking,  li ke the  location 
and extent of the property to be acquired, is 
a questi on for the legislative branch  that wi ll not 
be distu rbed by the courts absent fraud or a rbitrary 
and capricious action . 59 As long as the future need 
for the property can be fai r ly antici pated by the 
condem ner, the courts wi l l  not i nterfere with the 
condemner's determi nation of necessity.60 Si nce 
the condemner in Tennessee i s  not ba rred from 
the exercise of common sense or good business 
judgment in the operati on or  constructi on of 
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public fac i lities,61 it i s  li ke ly that Tennessee courts 
wou ld permit the condem nation of p roperty the 
condemner  fai r ly expects wil l  be needed to satisfy 
the condemner's future needs.  
Si nce condemnation cases have the dual  nature 
mentioned above, cha llenges to the condemner's 
right to take a re normally resolved as a pre liminary 
matter before the determination of the amount of 
just compensation to which the  prope rty owner i s  
entitled .62 The condem ner has the burden of proof 
of establishi ng the rig ht to take.63 The 
determi nation  of the right to take is a matter for 
the court and  not the ju ry.64 If the court finds  
that the condemner has  the  right to  take and  the 
condemner posts the  bon d req ui red by statute and 
takes possession of the property, the j udgment on 
the right to take issue becomes final  and  m ust be 
appea led at that time.65 Thus there may be two fina l  
judgments in  any condemnation action .66 
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Chapter Four 
J u  t om pe ati n 
The constitutiona l  requirement that p rivate property 
not be taken for pub li c  use without payment of just 
compensation  to the p roperty owner1 i s  satisfied 
by the payment of the fai r cash value2 o r  the fai r  
market va lue of the property on the date of the 
taking for pub lic use . 3  The "fair  market va lue" 
of the land  i s  the price that a reasonable buyer 
wou ld give if he or she was wi lling  to but did not 
have to purchase and  that a wi lli ng  se ller would 
take if he or she  was wi l li ng  to but did not have 
to sell the property in q uestion .4 The amount of 
just compensation to which the property owner i s  
entitled i s  a question for the ju ry or court acting  
as the trier  of  the facts,5 and  the parties have the 
right to a tria l  by jury.6 After the condemner's right 
to ta ke has been estab lished, the burden of proof 
s hifts to the property owner to show the amount of 
just compensation to which he or she is entitled to 
receive for the taki ng .? 
The  fai r market value of the property taken by the 
condemner  m ust be established as  of the date of 
the taki ng .8 Therefore the enhancement in  value or 
depreciation in  value of the p roperty that occurred 
before the taki ng  in antici pation of the com p letion 
of the pub lic improvement may not be consi dered by 
the ju ry.9 This p rob lem is usua lly encountered when 
a pub lic improvement i s  constructed i n  stages, or  
is en la rged so as to require additional  p roperty. If 
the property inc reases i n  value due to its proxi mity 
to the construction of the pub lic imp rovement, and  
at a later date the condemner decides to  acquire 
additiona l  land  for the expansion of the pub li c  
improvement, t he  condemner  i s  required to  pay for 
the enhanced value of the property.lO 
If, on the other hand ,  the public project from the 
beginn ing  contemp lated the  acquisition of several 
parcels of property, but on ly one was i n itia lly 
acqui red, the owners of the remai n ing tracts a re not 
entitled to benefit from any appreciation  i n  value 
reSUlti ng  from the construction of the project.l l 
This is known as the "scope of the p roject" ru le.  The 
condemner  has the burden of p roof in estab lish ing 
that the property i n  question was withi n the 
scope of the project.12 The condemner need not 
s how that the  p roperty was actua lly specified in  
the orig ina l  p lans  for the project so long  as it  
can be established that dur ing the cou rse of  the 
p lanning  or origi na l  construction of the p roject, 
it becomes evident that the property in question 
would be needed for the p roject.13 To determine 
whether  the appreciation in  value resu lted from the 
p roposed pub lic imp rovement, the tria l  court must 
make a p re liminary determination on the scope of 
the project, which will serve as  the basis for the 
admissi bi lity of comparab le sa les that mig ht reflect 
the appreciation .14 
I n  estab lishi ng the fai r  market va lue of the 
property being  taken, the ju ry may not consider 
pri ces previous ly offered by prospective buyers of 
the property.15 The p rices at which the property 
was previous ly offered for sa le also cannot be 
considered i n  determi n ing  the fai r  market value of 
the  property. 16 
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Evidence of environmenta l  contamination ,  as wel l  
as  the reasonable cost of  remediation , is re levant 
to the issue of valuation and erroneous exc lusion of 
this evidence warrants a new tria l .16A 
All capabi lities of the property and  a ll legitimate 
uses for which it is avai lab le and  reasonably 
adapted m ust be considered i n  determini ng the 
fai r  market va lue of the property.l? Therefore the 
probable i m mi nent rezon ing  of  the property m ay 
be considered i n  determini n g  the  capabi lities a nd  
uses for t he  p roperty.18 Present zoni ng i s  on ly one  of 
severa l factors to be considered in va lui ng  land  that 
is taken .  Zon ing  is not dispositive because zon ing 
changes may be made reflecti ng  the  changing 
needs and  circumstances of the  comm unity. This 
same  ru le applies to deed restrictions . 18A A lso the 
capabi lity of the  p roperty to be developed for one 
or more particu la r  uses may be shown so long  as 
the p roposed uses are not unfeasi b le or remote in 
li keli hood or i n  time, g iven the circumstances and 
location  of the property, and  so long  as these uses 
are not overemphasized . 19 
Specu lative value of property in the  hands of a 
future owner can not be considered .20 The renta l 
value of the  property taken may be co nsidered in  
estimati ng the  fai r m arket value of  the property. 2 1  
Ordi nari ly the profits of a bus iness located on 
the property a re not re levant to establish the 
fai r market value of the property, but there a re 
exceptions  to this ru le in  ci rcumstances where the 
property has  specia l  va lue to the owner and there i s  
no other  evidence upon which to establish the fai r  
market value o f  t he  p roperty. 22 
The parti cu lar  use for which the land  is most 
va luab le or to which it ; s  p resently adapted may 
be considered by the ju ry i n  determin ing the fai r 
market value of the property, but it may not be 
the sole basis  for that determination . 23 Th us  
a witness may not base his or h er esti mate of  the 
value of the property on its value  for a sin g le use 
such as the IIh ighest and  best use."24 A witness may 
testify that the property has  a fai r  market va lue 
of a certain amount and may exp lai n on  di rect 
and  cross examination the parti cu la r  qualities of 
the  property and the specific uses to which the 
property m ay be adapted, but the witness ca nnot 
testify that the property has a value of a certai n 
amount for "building  lot purposes" or Jlfor the best 
use ."25 This ru le is designed to avoid overvaluation 
of the property by preventi ng  the ju ry from givi ng  
excessive weight to  the  va lue of  the p roperty to 
the condemner.26 
The va lue of the land  to the owner i s  not ordi nari ly 
re levant if there is a ma rket value for the land . 27 
A partia l  exception to this ru le may exist when the  
property has a specia l value to  the owner, without 
possib le li ke value to others who may acquire it. 28 
Such a specia l  or  peculiar value to the owner may 
be taken into consideration  i n  determi ni ng  the  fai r  
market value of  the  property. 29 
One m ethod of establishi ng the  fai r  market value of 
the property being  taken is the i ntroduction of sa les 
of s imi lar  properties . 30 Whether a sa le is sufficiently 
comparab le to be admissib le is a p re liminary 
question for the tria l  court . 3 1 However, the tria l  
cou rt's discretion is not un limited and  the appellate 
courts will reverse the decision of the tria l  court i n  
t h e  appropriate circumstances . 32 
For a sa le to be sufficiently comparab le to be 
admissib le, it m ust have been a volunta ry sa le, 
or an arm's length transaction ,  and  cannot have 
been the resu lt of a com promise. 33 Therefore 
sa les to a condemner,34 or under the threat of 
condemnation ,3 5 are i nadmissib le, a s  are sa les of 
property upon which a re p laced un usua lly stringent 
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restrictions on the use of the property.36 Sales that 
have been affected or influenced by the public 
project for which the property is being acquired will 
also be inadmissible.37 
If the sale was an arm's length transaction, the trial 
court must next consider whether the properties are 
simi lar in nature and near the same location and 
that the time of the sale was at or about the time of 
the taking.38 In making this determination, the trial 
court wilL consider the size,39 the time of the sale,40 
changes in conditions since the time of the sale,41 
the current zoning or any imminent rezoning,42 
the location43 and also the vicinity, proximity to 
existing improvements, improvements existing on 
the properties, terrain or other geographic features, 
and all available uses to which the properties are 
adapted.44 The sales do not have to be exactly 
comparable in every respect and there is no general 
rule on the degree of similarity required.45 
After the trial court determines that a sale ;s 
comparable and may be admitted into evidence, 
the weight to be given to the sale is a question 
for the jury.46 If a particular sale was made under 
exceptional circumstances, these circumstances can 
be shown and the jury can determine the probative 
force of the sale.47 
a alue 
In addition to using comparable sales to determine 
the fair market value of the property taken by 
the condemner, and any incidental damages and 
incidental benefits to the remainder of the property, 
lay48 and expert witnesses49 can give opinion 
evidence on the vaLue of the property being 
taken. Thus the owner can give an opinion as to 
the fair market value of the property, but that 
opinion wi ll be given littLe weight when founded 
on pure speculation.50 
The trial court has wide discretion in the admission 
of expert testimony on the value of real property.51 
Nevertheless the court cannot permit an expert to 
give an opinion as to the value of real property for 
a particular purpose, but should require the expert 
to base his or her opinion on the fair market value 
for all legitimate uses for which the property is 
available and reasonably adapted.52 
The expert witness may state his or her opinion as 
to the value of the property and the basis on which 
he  or she arrived at that opinion.53 The answers 
given by the expert on cross examination may be 
considered by the court and jury in evaluating the 
opinion of the expert witness.54 
The court and the jury are not bound by the opinion 
of the expert witness. 55 
Inc ·  ent l Da m ges 
When the condemner takes a part but not all  of 
a parcel of property, the condemnation statutes 
permit the property owner to recover incidental 
damages for any injury to the remainder resulting 
from the taking (T.LA. § 29-16-114; 29-17-810) . The 
payment of incidental damages is not required by 
the Tennessee Constitution, but rather is provided 
by statute.56 Incidental damages are properly 
measured by the decline in the fair market value 
of the remainder of the property by virtue of the 
taking.57 The landowner in an eminent domain 
proceeding is not entitled to a jury trial on what 
kinds of damages are to be included in an incidental 
damages award .57A 
The award of incidental damages is limited to those 
property owners whose property is actually taken 
by the condemner.58 Adjacent property owners 
whose land is not condemned but is neverth eless 
adversely affected by the construction of the public 
MINENT DOMAIN IN TEN N ESSEE • M U NICIPAL TECHNICAL A DVISORY SERVICE 
--�--
improvement can not recover i nci dental damages 
under these statutes .  59 
Where a portion of the p roperty has  been taken, 
the property owner may recover i n cidenta l  damages 
only upon a showing of some specific inju ry to the  
remainder, or  i ts  va lue, wh ich  i s  the  direct resu lt 
of the taking .60 The inju ry m ust be more than an  
inconvenience shared by  a ll members of  the pUblic; 
rather, it m ust specifica lly affect the remai nder 
of the property that was taken .61 This does not 
resu lt in  an  inju ry becoming  noncompensable 
mere ly because other p roperty owners a re simi la rly 
affected .62 If the p rope rty owner can estab lish that 
exceptiona l  ci rcumstan ces attend  the taking and  
u se  of  the  property by  the  condemner that resu lt in  
a special i nj u ry to the remain der of  the property, 
the property owner may recover i nci denta l damages 
even if the  specia l  inju ry is common to al l  property 
in the area .63 
In addition to the dimi nution in the fai r market 
va lue of the  remai nde r, the condemnation statutes 
i nclude as i ncidenta l  damages : the reasonable 
expenses i ncurred for removing , re locati ng  a n d  
reinsta lli ng  of  furniture, h ouseho ld belong ings, 
fixtures, equipment, machinery or stock in  trade 
to another location not more than fifty (50)  mi les 
di stant; the costs of any necessary disconnection ,  
dismounti ng  or disassemb ling  and  load ing and 
d rayage of the  chatte ls ; the recordi ng fees, transfer 
taxes and  other si m i la r  expenses i ncidental to 
conveyin g  the p roperty to the condemner; mortgage 
prepayment penalties; and the proration of rea l  
property taxes (T.LA. § 29-16-114) . 
The p roperty owner can recover on ly moving  
expenses that have been  actua lly i ncurred a t  the 
date of tria l  or  that can be shown to be reasonab ly 
necessary in  the future and  can be accurately 
estimated by witnesses .64 The landowner  i s  entitled 
to average hour ly wage for la bor costs related to 
re location ,  but not the IIbu rden rate" added for the 
cost of uti lities, hea lth insu rance, and reti rement .64A 
These i n ci denta l  damages cannot be recovered 
if the chattels to be moved a re destroyed by fi re 
before moving .65 Also moving  or re location expenses 
cannot be recovered for the removal  of equipment, 
fixtures or other chatte ls that were not located on 
the land  taken by the condemner.66 
A lthoug h not specifica lly set out by statute, the 
fo llowing  have a lso been found  to constitute 
in cidenta L  damages to the  extent they red uced the 
fai r  market value of the remai nder of the property: 
noise, soot and i nconvenience created by the 
operation of a rai lroad ; 67 obstruction of view by 
a highway emban kment; 68 reasonable app rehension 
of danger from the pub lic improvement; 69 changes in 
the d rai nage;7Q loss of access to an  abutti ng  street;71 
a nd  a decrease in bus iness .7 1A 
I ..... �,. or • . """" nl -,,-
The condemner  is entitled to have the amount  
of in cidenta l damages reduced by the amount of 
i ncidental benefits that accrue to the remai nder 
as the  resu lt of the construction of the pub li c  
i mprovement (T.LA.  § 29-16-114; 29-17-810) . 
Li ke i n ci denta l damages, i n ci denta l benefits a re 
determined independently of the j ust compensation 
requi red by the Tennessee Constitution .72 Therefore 
incidenta l benefits cannot be considered i n  
determin ing  the  amount  o f  j ust com pensation to 
which the  property owner is entitled for the portion  
of  the property taken by  the condemner.73 
I ncidental benefits i nc lude on ly th ose benefits 
special  to the remai nder of the property owner's 
property as opposed to those genera l  benefits 
of a pub lic im provement shared by the pub lic 
at la rge.74 However, i ncidenta l benefits are not 
p revented from bei ng specia l by the fact that 
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other properties a buttin g the public  imp rovement 
are simila rly benefitted where those benefits are 
not common to al l  the properties i n  the vi cinity/ 5 
Th us, increa sed accessibi lity to the property,7 6 or 
easy access parki ng77 may sti ll constitute i ncidenta l 
benefits even though  property owners on the sa me 
street have a lso gained better access or  parking .  
On the  other  hand, a genera l in crease in  property 
value experienced by a l l  area residents as a result 
of street i m provements does not constitute an 
i n cidental benefit that may be set off against 
in cidenta l damages/8 
T he general rule is that the in cidenta l  damages 
and i n cidental benefits are to be estimated as of 
the date of the taking/9 However, sin ce i ncidenta l 
damages and i n cidental benefits are premised on the 
impact to the remainder of the property resulting 
from the construction of the pub lic improvement, 
proof showing the damage or benefits occurrin g 
after the taking has been pe rmitted in instances 
where the tria l occurs long  after the pub li c  
improvement has been comp leted.8 0 Property owners 
wh ose property is being acquired fo r street, road, 
highway, freeway, or pa rkway purposes are entitled 
to obtai n a continuance of the condemnation 
case until the pub li c  i mprovement is comp leted 
to e liminate the uncertainty as to the in cidenta l 
damages or incidenta l benefits that may occur 
as the resu lt of the construction of the pub lic 
im provement (T.LA. § 29-17-1201) . If the 
con demnation case is  tried before the project 
is comp leted, maps, drawings, or  photographs  
of  the  land may be i ntroduced at  tria l a s  long 
as the evidence wou ld not be misleading  
(T.LA. § 29 -17-1202) . 
Interest at two percentage poi nts g reater than 
the pri me loan rate establish ed,  as  of th e date of 
the taki ng,  by the federal reserve system of the 
United States must be paid by the condem ner on 
any judgment obtai ned by the property owner 
(lLA.  § 29-17-813) . T his i nterest is a llowed from 
the date of the taki ng on the amount i n  excess of 
the amount deposited with the  clerk of the court.8 1  
-------�-------
Chapter Five 
I verse o dem n tl on 
te  
As  noted i n  Chapter One, t he  Tennessee 
Constitution's Artic le I, Section  21  prohibits the 
taking of private property for publi c  use without the 
payment of just compensation .  A property owner 
whose property is taken for a public use without 
the payment of just compensation  has a remedy for 
the taking i n  a IJreverse condemnation" or "i nverse 
condemnation" action (T.CA .  § 29-16-123) . 1 But this 
statute does not provide authority to fi le suit for 
inverse condemnation in  a state court against the 
state.1A The property owner may a lso bri ng an  action 
for trespass i n  a proper case and  is not limited to 
proceeding  by the statutory method prescribed for 
inverse condemnation actions .  The  property owner 
who sues for damages i n  a trespass action may a lso 
recover punitive damages i n  an  appropriate case . 2  
Inverse condemnation claims  have been c lassified 
by the courts i nto two genera l  categories : physical 
tak ings and regu latory ta kings . 3 Physica l  ta ki n gs 
occur where property in  additio n  to that previous ly 
condemned i n  formal  proceedi ngs is taken by the 
condemner  without payment of just compensation 
to the property owner,4 or  where an entity with 
the power of eminent domain appropriates private 
property for pub li c  use without the i nstitution 
of forma l condemnation proceedi ngs . 5 Regulatory 
ta ki ngs occur when a regu lation  adopted u nder 
the police power fai ls to substantia lly advance 
a leg itimate state i nterest,6 or denies an  owner 
economica lly viable u se of his or her  property.? 
One of the most difficult questions presented i n  
any  taki ngs case i s  whether the  damages that 
have occurred to private property are sufficient to 
constitute a tak ing for which j ust compensation 
must be paid .  Courts have he ld that the action 
of any entity with the power of eminent domain  
i n  carrying  out the  purposes for which i t  was 
created may constitute a ta king when it destroys, 
interrupts, or  interferes with the common and  
necessary u se  o f  rea l  property o f  another, even i f  
there i s  no actua l  entry upon t he  property.8 
Not every action by an entity with the power 
of eminent domain that damages or interferes 
in the use of private property, however, will 
constitute a taking .9 Whether a tak ing has occurred 
is a fact-specifi c  determination based on the nature, 
extent, and  du ration of the intrusion onto the 
private property.1O 
Thus, as noted in the precedi ng  chapter on 
i nci denta l  damages, a property owner whose 
la nd  i s  not formally condemned for a publi c  
improvement may not, as  a genera l ru le, recover 
for the consequentia l  damages resulti ng  from the 
construction or operation of a pub lic im provement 
located near, but not on,  h is  or  her  property. l 1  
These non recoverab le damages include a ll i nju ries 
natura lly and unavoidably resu lti ng from the 
proper, non-negligent construction or operation 
of a pub li c  improvement that a re shared genera lly 
by property owners whose properties lie with in  the 
range of the i nconveniences necessari ly i n cident to 
the improvement. 12 
Thus, the owner whose property is formal ly 
condemned in  part for the construction of a pub lic 
im provement wi ll be entitled to recover i nci denta l 
damages whi le the owner whose land  is not forma lly 
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condemned but n onetheless suffers actual damages 
from the construction or operation of a public 
improvement n earby will not be entitled to recover 
for these damages. This distinction results from 
the eminent domain statutes permitting incidental 
damages to be recovered where a portion of a larger 
tract of property is taken for a public improvement, 
while the inverse condemnation remedy is available 
only to owners of property that is taken,  and n ot 
just damaged, by an entity with the power of 
eminent domain. 
Courts have found that a taking has occurred 
when the proper non- negligent construction of 
a public improvement directly invades or peculiarly 
affects private property a n d  creates substantial 
and  continual interference with the practical use 
and enjoyment of the land.  Thus, takings have 
been found where the entity with the power 
of eminent domain failed to acquire drainage 
easements or flowage easements sufficient to 
handle the storm water runoff or other discharges 
necessarily incidental to public improvements,13 or 
diverted a stream to another property as the result 
of the construction of a public improvement,14 
or denied access to a highway as the result of 
the construction on the highway.15 Takings have 
also been found where the entity with the power 
of eminent domain failed to acquire adequate 
slope easements for highways, resulting in the 
encroachment of the highway on private property,16 
or failed to acquire aircraft over-flight easements 
across property located adjacent to airports,17 or 
failed to acquire interests on property affected 
by non -natural electric conditions produced by an 
electric street railroad company.18 In each of these 
cases the courts found that the nature, extent, and 
duration of the intrusion on, or interference with, 
private property resulted in the taking. 
Mere proof, however, that the construction or 
maintenance of a public improvement has resulted 
in a loss of profits from a business operated 
on property located adjacent to the public 
improvement, 19 or has resulted in a decrease in 
property value20 will be insufficient to establish 
a taking. A decrease in business, however, may 
require compensation.20A 
Another problem that must be confronted in 
determining whether or not an injury to private 
property constitutes a taking is the distinction 
between a nuisance and a taking.21 Courts have 
defined a nuisance as anything that annoys or 
disturbs the free use of one's property, or that 
renders its ordinary use or  physical occupation 
uncomfortable.22 A temporary nuisance is 
a nuisance that can be corrected by the expenditure 
of labor or money.23 Courts usually classify as 
a nuisance injuries to private property that 
result from the improper, negligent construction 
or operation of a public improvement or that 
are temporary in nature and permit successive 
recoveries by the property owner until the nuisance 
is abated .24 Conversely, courts usually classify 
as takings injuries to property of a permanent 
nature resulting from the proper, non-negligent 
construction or operation of a public improvement 
and permit only a single recovery.25 
Whether a particular activity sufficiently interferes 
with the use of private property to constitute 
a compensable taking is a matter of degree. The 
conceptual difficulty inherent in classifying 
a particula r activity may be simplified by 
visualizing, on a continuum, consequential damages, 
nuisance damages, and damages recoverable for 
a taking. At one extreme may be placed 
consequential damages which, as noted above, 
would include all injuries naturally and unavoidably 
resulting from the proper, non -negligent 
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construction or operation of a pub lic imp rovement 
that do  not di rectly invade o r  pecu liar ly affect 
the p lai ntiff's private property, but rather a re 
shared by the public genera lly. Consequentia l  
damages a re thus  ana logous to damages caused 
by a pub lic n uisance for which a p rivate p roperty 
owner cannot recover without establishi n g  da mages 
attributab le to the private n uisa nce .  At the 
center of the conti nuum may be p laced nuisance 
damages resu lti ng  from the imp roper, neg ligent 
construction or operation of a pub li c  imp rovement 
that substantia lly i nterferes with the practica l  use 
and enjoyment of the p rivate property and that 
peculia rly affects the property. These damages are 
recoverab le on ly under  a theory of tem porary private 
nuisance, and a re actionable unti l the n uisance is 
fina lly abated .  At the other extreme m ay be p laced 
damages recoverab le for a taking ,  which i nclude 
those resu lti ng from the p roper, non-neg ligent 
construction or operation  of a pub li c  imp rovement 
that directly i nvades or peculiarly affects the 
private p roperty and  creates a substantia l and 
continuing  interference with its practica l use and 
enjoyment. Th us, da mages for a taki ng i n  this sense 
closely approximate and  may, in  a practi cal  sense, 
be virtua lly indisti nguishable from those recoverab le 
for a permanent private n uisance. Si nce this 
discussion reveals that the fi nding of a taki ng  
i s  a fact specific inqui ry, it is he lpfu l to  review 
the circumstances where courts have found  
a physical  taki ng .  
m nt of 
Cou rts in Tennessee have recognized that a p roperty 
owner  has an easement of access between his 
land and the abutti ng  street, which extends to 
the center of the abutti ng  street, absent any 
evidence to the contrary. 26 Although as  noted i n  the 
precedi ng  chapter some courts have found  that an  
impai rment of  a p roperty owner's easement of access 
ca n constitute i n ci denta l  damages to the remainder 
of property when a portion  of the property is taken 
i n  a condemnation  action ,  other courts have he ld 
that any impairment of this rig ht of i ng ress and  
egress constitutes a taki ng for wh ich  the owner  
may recover j ust compensation in  an  inverse 
con demnation action . 27 Thus p roperty owners have 
been allowed to recover just com pensation where 
the owners' access was destroyed by a change 
i n  the g rade of  a street or h ighway,28 or  by the 
construction of a fen ce,2 9  or  by the construction  of 
a drai nage ditch a longside a highway. 3 0  Inci dental 
damages were allowed when curbing  im pai red fu ll 
access from the abutting  street. 30A 
In addition to an easement of access, a p rivate 
property owner whose property abuts a pub li c  street 
or road has an  easement of way, or  r ight of passage, 
i n  the street abutting  his or her  property. 31 This 
easement of way is a private property rig ht that 
exists in  addition to the rig ht to use the  street i n  
com mon with the genera l  pub li c .  3 2  This easement 
extends a long any street or a lley upon which the 
owner's property abuts, in  either direction ,  to the 
next intersecti ng street. 33 Th is  rig ht is usua lly 
impaired by the closing of pub lic streets or roads . 34  
No recovery has been al lowed when a two-way 
street abutti ng an owner's property has been 
changed to a one-way street, as this  constitutes 
a valid exercise of the police power for which  the 
payment of  just com pensation is requi red on ly in  
u n usual  ci rcumstances . 35 
Takings have been found  where the construction  
or operation of  a pub li c  imp rovement resulted i n  
recurri ng  flooding  of  p rivate property,36 or  i n creased 
the amount of storm water runoff that caused 
erosion . 3? A ta ki ng has a lso been found  where water 
was regu larly discharged from wate r treatment 
faci lities across adjoin ing  private property,38 or 
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where a public imp rovement a ltered the flow 
of a stream and caused erosion,39 or  where 
the construction of a publi c  improvement 
diverted a stream that previously flowed across 
private property.40 
r 5 
A ta king of airspace above private property may 
resu lt from frequent low flights of aircraft that 
substantia lly interfere with the practical  use and 
enjoyment of  the property.41 Noise, vibrations and 
ai rplane pollutants unaccompanied by an actuaL 
physi caL invasion of the airspace immediate ly over 
the property owner's land may aLso constitute 
a taking .  Direct overfLi ght is not required .42 
A taki ng has also been found when trees were cut 
on private property in an airport approach zone 
established by a municipa L ordinance.43 The court 
found that the removal of the trees and the Limiti ng 
of the height of bui ldings in the airport approach 
zone constituted a ta ki ng .44 
n 
Where a condem ner appropriates private property 
prior to the institution of formal  condemnation 
proceedings, a taking obviously occurs. Th us, 
a taking occurred where electri c transmission Lines 
were constructed before a condem nation proceedi ng 
was fi led.45 In that situation the appropriati on 
is i llegaL  unti L j ust compensation is paid to the 
property owner, and the condem ner acqui res 
only a possessory right that is not transferable.46 
Ta kings have a lso been found where a condemner 
fi led condemnation proceedings but nonsuited 
the proceedings  before payi ng j u st com pensation 
to the property owner,47 where a munic ipality 
annexed a subdivision and asserted ownership over 
the water and sewer system servi n g  it without 
payi ng  j ust compensation to its owners,48 where 
the condemner fai led to acquire the interest of 
the lessee of property conveyed to the condemner 
by the lessor, 49 or where the condemner fai led to 
acquire the property interests in certain restri ctive 
covenants from the residents of a subdivision before 
constructing a publi c  im provement in vio lation of 
those covenants.50 The property owner's sole remedy 
for these ta ki ngs is an inverse condemnation action, 
as the courts have specifi cally rejected attempts 
to enjoin, 51 or  eject52 the condemner who has 
taken th e property without instituting 
condemnation proceedings. 
A signifi cant issue presented in any case where 
a property owner seeks to recove r just compensation 
for the taking of private property in addition 
to that previously acqui red by the condemner is 
whether the property owner  i s  estopped by the 
prior condemnation award or deed to the condemner 
from recoveri ng additiona l  compensation. 53 The 
condem nation award encompasses a ll damages, 
present and futu re, the  p roperty owner knew 
or should have known would result from the 
proper construction  or operation of the public  
im provement.54 The burden of proof of showing 
an estoppel is on the condemner, unless the  
language of  the  condem nation decree or deed 
is unambig uous . 55 
An exception to this rule applies for losses or 
damage that could not reasonably have been 
antici pated by either pa rty or, if a lleged by the 
property owner in  the condemnation p roceedi ng,  
wou ld have been rejected as  specuLative or  
conjectura l.56 Under th is  exception, recovery 
has been permitted for landslides onto private 
prope rty that resu lted from cuts made during 
the construction of a highway,57 for damage to 
a dam caused by excessive blasting during the 
construction of a pi peline,58 and for damage to 
a wall caused by blasting for electri c transmission 
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lines.59 Recovery has been denied when the property 
owner knew or shou ld have known that the curbs 
limiting  access to his property would be constructed 
as part of a h ighway project60 or where the fi ll 
from a street that was e levated by the condemner  
spread onto adjoining property s ince the owner 
knew or should have known that the fi ll wou ld have 
encroached upon his  property when he  conveyed 
a portion of the p roperty to the condemner for the 
street improvement project.6 1 
The United States Supreme (ourt revolutionized the 
law of regu latory taki ngs in 1987 when it he ld that 
a local government m ust pay just compensation for 
temporary reg ulatory takings . 62 Also in  that same 
year the U .S .  Supreme (ourt decided two other cases 
that dealt with regu latory takings . 63 Si nce th ose 
decisions,  regu latory taking cases have flooded the 
courts as property owners seek to recover for the 
diminution i n  the va lue of thei r property resulti ng 
from the enforcement of police power regu lations  
affecting p rivate p roperty. Not surprisi ng ly, most of  
these cases invo lve land use regu lations adopted by 
local govern ments.  
Alth ough the  inverse condemnation statute wou ld 
not appear to be app li cab le by its terms to 
a regulatory taki ng  of private property where no 
physical i nvasion o r  i nterference i s  i nvolved, the 
U .S .  Supreme  (ou rt64 and  a Tennessee cou rt6 5 h ave 
held that an inverse condemnation action cou ld 
be mai ntained based on un reasonab le restrictions 
placed on the use of property by a regu lation 
adopted under the police power. 
A regu lation adopted under  the police power can 
resu lt i n  a taking of p rivate property for which 
the payment of just compensation is requi red i f  
the regu lation fai ls to su bstantia lly advance 
a legiti mate state interest, 66 or denies the owner 
econ omically viab le use of his or  her  property.67 
The fi rst part of this two-pronged test requi res 
the court to determine  whether the govern mental 
entity has a legitimate state interest that 
prompted the adoption of the regu lation . 68 A broad 
range of govern mental purposes wi ll satisfy this 
requi rement, i ncluding ensur ing proper residentia l  
development,69 prohi biting  barriers to  pub li c  access 
to beach a reas,l° protecting beaches from erosion,71 
p rotecti ng  resi dential neighborhoods from noise, 
litteri ng and  vanda lism associated with transient 
use of residential property,72 and controLLi ng  the 
rate or character of residential g rowth .73 Tempora ry 
moratoria on development a re not subject to a per 
se taking ru le and may withstand  a ta king  clai m .  
The standards  set out i n  Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City appLy in these cases. 73A 
Un reasonable denia ls of proposa ls for development, 
however, may engender liab i lity u nder 42 U .S .c .  
1983, and  a ju ry tria l  i s  avai lab Le to  determi ne  
these clai ms .73 B 
If a Leg iti mate state interest i s  p resent the court 
m ust determine whether the regu lation substantia lly 
advances that interest,74 The government i s  entitled 
to a presumption that the regulation does advance 
the public interest;75 h owever, a property owner 
can overcome this presumption  by showing the  lack 
of a nexus between the  effect of the regu lation 
and  its orig ina l  pu rpose/6 Th us, courts have found  
that  requi ring  a property owner  to g rant a pub lic 
easement a long a beach as  a condition to construct 
a house on a beach does not substa ntially advance 
the public interest i n  protecting  the pub lic's abi lity 
to see the  beach77 and  that a requi rement of 
a dedication of lan d  for a g reenway and  bicycle/ 
pedestrian  pathway did not bear the necessary 
relationship to p roblems created by a commercia l  
development to avoid a taki ng/7A In addition the 
regu lation must be reasonably re lated to the pub lic  
need or burden that a property owner's use of h is  
25 
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or  her p roperty creates or to which it contrib utes.78 
The refore regu lations  that impose land  dedication  
req ui rements to  develop  property may constitute 
a taking if the property owner is required to 
dedicate property in excess of the amount that 
is necessary to offset the  additiona l burdens on 
the public  interest resu lti ng from the use of his 
or her property.79 The cost to the landowner must 
be "rough ly p roportiona l" to the additional  pub lic 
burden caused by the development/9A 
The second prong of the taki ng test requi res an  
i nqui ry i nto whether the regu lation denies the 
property owner the economically viab le use of his or  
her property.80 This is  a high ly fact-specific i nquiry 
that is not subject to a set formu la .81 Whethe r 
a taking has occurred  i s  a question of degree and 
cannot be determi ned by genera l  p ropositions .82 The 
cou rts h ave used ad hoc factua l  i nquiries  relying on 
factors such as the character of the govern menta l 
action ,  the economic impact of the regu lation 
on the p roperty owner, the interference with 
rea sonab le investment-backed expectations, and  
t he  nature and extent of  the interference with the 
rig hts in the property as a whole .83 Where 
a state regulation prohibits al l  economica lly 
beneficial  use of land,  to be imposed without 
necessity of compensation, it must do no more than 
dup licate what could otherwise be done unde r  the 
state's nui sance laws.83A 
In consi dering the economic impact of the 
regulation on p rivate prope rty, the courts re cognize 
that the mere dim inution of property value, or the 
substantia l  reduction of the attractiveness of the 
property to potenti a l  purchasers, or the denial  of 
the abi lity to exp loit a property right the owner 
previously believed was avai lab le, wi ll not suffice 
to estab lish a tak ing .84 The i nqui ry must instead 
focus on the va lue  of the remain ing uses to which 
the property may be put,85 and a comparison of 
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the owner's investment or basis  with the ma rket 
value of the property subject to the regu lation .86 
When consideri ng whether the regu lation i nterferes 
with the owner's investment-backed expectations, 
the cou rt m ust determine that the expectations 
were reasonab le, or  at least consistent with the 
law in  force at the tim e  of the formation of the 
expectation.8? The purchase price is on ly one of the 
factors that shou ld be considered in determining  
whether  a regu lation interferes with reasonab le 
i nvestment-backed expectations.88 
Courts applying these factors have found  takings 
in insta nces where there was no value for the uses 
remai ning for the p roperty after the adoption of 
the regulation,89 and  where there was a loss of 
96 percent of the possib le rate of return on an 
i nvestment.9o Courts have rejected takings c lai ms 
where valuable uses of the  property remained after 
the impositi on of the regu lation ,  even if those u ses 
were not the most va luab le u ses.91 
S 
Si nce the determination of whether a particu la r  
regu lation has resu lted i n  a taki ng of  private 
property depends upon the economic impact of the 
regu lation, a taki ngs clai m is not ripe, and ca nnot 
be considered by a court, unti l the  p roperty owner 
has obtained a final decision from the appropriate 
governmental agency on the appli cation of the 
regu lation to the parti cu la r  parcel of  property.92 In  
the  zoning context this final decis ion requirem ent 
forces the p roperty owner to obtain two decisions  
from the  govern mental entity, a rejected 
deve lopment  plan a nd  a denia l of a variance.g3 Unti l 
the property owner has  obtained a fina l  decision, 
it is not possib le to determ ine  the  actual economic 
impact of a regu lation on the p roperty i n  q uesti on .94 
For tak ing c laims brought in federa l cou rts there is 
a second ripeness requi rement: the property owner 
----�----
must fi rst have sought just compensation i n  the 
state courts before bringi n g  a takin gs c la im i n  
the federa l courts.95 Th us  a property owner i n  
Tennessee m ust fi rst bri ng  an  inverse condemnation 
action i n  the state courts before fi li ng  suit i n  the 
federal courts to recover ju st compensation for 
a regu latory taki ng .  
The  normal measure of damages i n  an  inverse 
condemnation case i s  the same as i n  any other  
condemnation case.96 Thus  where a permanent 
regu latory taki ng  has  occurred the measure of 
damages is as discussed i n  Chapter Four. Where 
a temporary taking  occurs, the property owner is 
entitled to the va lue of the use of the property 
dur ing the time of the temporary tak ing .97 The 
va lue of the tem porary use of property is normally 
measured by the diffe rence i n  renta l value resu lti ng  
from the  im position of  the  regu lation .98 Some 
courts, however, have permitted the property owner  
to recover i n  excess of  the renta l  va lue of  the 
property based on  the fai r  market value of the r ight 
to develop the property.99 
Inverse condemnation suits m ust be com menced 
within  one year after the land has been 
actua lly taken possession of, and the work 
of the proposed interna l  im provement begun 
(T.CA .  § 29-16-1 24) . 100 In  establi shi ng  the date the 
ta king occurred, which com mences the running of 
the statute of li mitations, the courts consider the 
date of the actual  i nju ry to the property, or the 
date the owner had reasonab le notice or knowLedge 
of the i nju ry.l0l 
These genera l  ru les are somewhat difficu lt to app ly 
where the p rivate property is taken due to a pub lic 
improvement located on  adjacent property, or  
due to a regu latory tak ing .  Th us, the statute of 
limitations was found  not to bar  a s uit fi led five 
years after a pub lic improvement was completed on 
adjacent p roperty but fi led within one year of the 
date floodi ng occurred on the private property. 102 In  
a case i nvo lving a ta k ing of  ai rspace due to  ai rcraft 
overflights, the court found  that the operative date 
for the purposes of the statute of limitations was 
the date that direct overflights of low-flyi ng 
ai rcraft com menced over private property, i n stead  
of the  date the  property for the  ai rport was 
condemned or the date the construction of the 
ai rport was comp leted . 1 03 
The statute of li mitations does not commence unti l  
the Landowner knows o r  shou ld have known that 
the injury to his or her p roperty was permanent i n  
nature .104 Th us ,  where a property owner received 
repeated assurances from the condemner  over 
a two-year period that floodin g  caused by hig hway 
construction wou ld be corrected, the cou rt he ld that 
the statute of limitations did not bar the suit si nce 
the court found  that the suit was fi led within one  
year of  the date the  property owner discovered that 
the condem ner had fai led to correct the prob lem .l05 
A simi la r  resu lt was obtai ned i n  a case invo lvi ng 
a municipal ordi nance that limited the heig ht 
of bu i ldings that couLd be constructed in  an 
airport g Lide path . 106 The court rejected the 
m unicipality's argument that the passage of the  
ordi nance commenced the running of  the statute of 
li mitations, ho lding instead that the statute began 
to run on ly when the owner's property was inju red  
by  the  taking and not when  he  or she had  notice of 
the taking .107 
In  instances where the condemner nonsuits 
a condemnation case after com menci ng  
construction of  a pub li c  imp rovement, the  statute 
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of limitations began  to run on the date the nonsuit 
is entered rather than the date construction was 
com menced.108 
n 
If a p roperty owner prevai ls in an  inverse 
condemnation case, he or she is entitled to 
recover from the condemner his or her reasonable 
costs, disbursements and expenses inc ludi ng  
reasonable atto rney, appraisa l, and  engineeri ng 
fees actually incurred because of the proceedings 
(T.CA. § 29-16-123) . The tria l court must award 
these fees to the p roperty owner if a demand i s  
made by the property owner, although the court has 
the discretion to determine the rea sonableness of 
those fees. 109 
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Chapter Six 
Le sehold Damages 
n 
It has been held that a leasehold constitutes 
a compensable property i nterest unde r  the law 
of emi nent domain .1 This interest has been 
characterized as  the right of the lessee to remain in  
undisturbed possession of the leased premise unti l  
the expi ration  o f  his term . 2  A lessee's entitlement to 
damages is not limited to cases where the  leasehold 
property is actually taken  o r  destroyed ,  but extends 
even to cases where im pai rment of access to the 
leasehold property can be s hown .3 Also a tenant 
is  entitled to recover com pensation where the  
condemnation of  a part of  the  leased premises 
destroys the va lue of the leasehold .4 
th L 
The lessee is entitled to a ny excess i n  value of 
his or her unexpired leasehold over and  above the 
rentals that would be due for the  unexpi red term,5 
or in other words he o r  she is  entitled to recover 
the fai r  market value  of his or  her leasehold i nterest 
less the rents he or she  must pay to the La ndlord.6 
While evidence of a property owner's business p rofit 
is normally not a llowed in condemnation cases, 
this may be admissib le under the pecu liar  facts of 
a case to show the fai r market value of the lessee's 
interest.1 In the event of a partia l  tak ing of the 
leasehold, the lessee is entitled to recover the 
difference i n  value of the lease before the taking 
and  the value of the lease after the taki ng .8 
Incidental damages to the leasehoLd include, 
by statute, the lessee's movi ng  expenses9 
(T.CA.  § 29-16-114) , and  where on ly a portion 
of the leaseho ld is acquired, any damage to the 
remainder  of the leasehold .lO 
Where a partia l  taki ng  of property subject to 
a leasehold occurs, the j u ry m ust first determine 
the  total amount of just com pensation for the 
taking,  i ncluding the  fai r, reasonable cash market 
value of the property taken, on the date of the 
taking ,  and i ncidental  damages, if any, to that 
portion of the property remai n ing .ll In determinin g  
t h e  tota l fai r  market va lue o f  t h e  fee, t h e  j u ry 
shou ld consi der the leasehold as  one e lement of 
the tota l fai r market va lue of the property, as 
the leaseho ld i ndicates one avai lable use of the 
property. 12 The tota l compensation is  to in clude 
a ll losses suffered by a ll parties havi ng  an  i nterest 
i n  the property affected and cannot exceed the 
value of the fee, unencumbered by the lea se on the 
date of taki ng .13 The  j u ry then apportions the tota l 
compensation  between the land lord and  tenant.14 
In the typica l  condemnation case involving  leased 
premises, the p roperty owner and lessee a re joi ned 
as  parties and the lessee is  awarded a portion of 
the damages assessed as the value of the tota l 
property condem ned .  As  n oted above, the tota l 
compensation  awarded to the owner and  lessee may 
not exceed the value of the unencumbered fee and  
this value, once estab lished,  may not be further 
i ncreased because of the existence of an  unexpi red 
lease at the time of condemnation .1 5 In  other words, 
the value of the leasehold is considered to be a n  
i ntegra l  part of the tota l va lue o f  t he  unencumbered 
tract of  land . 16 
The ju ry should then apportion the tota l 
compensation (fair market value p lus  i n cidental  
damages) between lessor and  lessee by determin ing 
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the Lessee's interest, wh ich is the fai r  ma rket 
value of the leasehold on the property min us rent 
actua lly ca lled for in the lease plus the i n cidenta l 
damages to the leasehold, with the remainder 
of the property's fai r  market va lue going to the 
lessor.17 This form u la fo r apportionment is app licab le 
regard less of whether a long term or short term 
lease is involved .ls 
The condemner may specify in the condemnation 
petition the various interests of the lessor and 
lessee, a pportion the amount deposited with the 
court and  settle the case with either the lessor 
or  the lessee. 19 If the condemner fo llows this 
procedure, the lessee or lessor may then withd raw 
its amount in fu ll satisfaction of its claim. 20 
Both the property owner and  lessee have an  
i n dependent right to  appea L  the  amount of damages 
awarded : joinder of parties is not necessa ry.21 On 
appea l, the cou rt may increase the award to the 
appellant as long as it  determines that the i nitia l 
award did not accurate ly reflect the fair market 
va lue of the unencumbered fee, 2 2 or did not reflect 
the tota l aggregate amount of i ncidenta l damages.23 
Th us, any relief g ranted on appeal must be through 
an increase of the tota L award rather than 
a reallocation of the lower court's award . 24 
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The Federal Uniform Relocation Assista nce and  
Real Property Acquisition Po licies Act  of  19701 
was enacted for the purpose of p roviding  fai r and  
equitable treatment of persons dispLaced as a resu lt 
of federal and  federa lly assisted programs, 2  a s  
well as consistent treatment of  owners du ri ng  the  
actual l and  acquisition . 3 The provisions of  the  act 
are mandatory and app Ly to any pub li c  agency that 
administers progra ms supported at least in part by 
federaL  funds .  The act consists of three subchapters : 
(1) Genera l  P rovisions, which defi nes terms used 
in the act; 4 (2) Un iform Relocation Assistan ce, 
which is  concerned with movi ng and  related 
expenses, rep lacement housi ng  payments, relocation 
assistance advisory services, and  the federal share 
of the cost of such payments and  services; 5 a nd  
(3) Un iform Real Property Acquisition Poli cy, which 
sets out the procedures to be fo llowed i n  acquiri ng  
rea l property.6 
In 1972, Tennessee enacted the Un iform Relocation 
Assistance Act of 1972, which genera lly fo llowed 
the provisions of the federa l  act and  had the 
effect of maki n g  relocation assistan ce and land  
acquisition proced ures mandatory for any projects 
con ducted by state agencies or supported by state 
financia l  assistance (T.LA. § 13-11-101 et  seq . ) . The  
Tennessee act was  amended i n  1980 to  a lso i nclude 
any projects by a m unicipa lity or a county that 
received federa l  or state financia l  assistance. 
The focus of this chapter wi ll be on the land  
acquisition procedures, si nce these are of 
considerable importan ce to attorneys representi ng  
r ",\p\/Pn 
condemners or condem nees. The federa l  govern ment 
has  p romu lgated govern ment-wide regu lations  for 
rea l  property acquisition/ which have been 
adopted by reference by such agen cies as  the 
Tennessee Va lley Authority,8 the Envi ronmental  
Protection Agency9 and  the Department of 
Housi ng  and Urban Development.1o 
Before the acquisition of a ny tract of property by 
a pub lic agency subject to the federa l and/or state 
re location acts, a fu ll appraisa l of the tract must 
be m ade.  The regu lations generally require that: 
(1) the p roperty be appraised before the i n itiation 
of any negotiations with the property owner; 
(2 )  the owner, or his designated representative, 
be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser 
duri ng his inspection of the property; (3)  the 
acquir ing agency establish the am ount it believes 
to be j ust compensation before the in itiation of 
any negotiations with the property owner; and  
(4) the  acqui rin g  agency make a written offer to  
the property owner  for the fu ll amount believed to 
be the  j ust com pensation . The written offer m ust 
be accompanied by a written sum mary statement 
of the offer explain ing  the amount of the offer, the 
description  of the property being  acquired ,  and an 
identification  of any improvements being  acquired . l l  
The agency must make reasonable efforts to 
contact the owner a n d  discuss the offer, and  
explain the  basis for the  offer a nd  the acquisition 
poli cies of the agency. The owner m ust be given 
a reasonable opportunity to consider the offer and  
1 
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present material the owner believes is relevant 
in determining the amount of just compensation 
to which the owner is entitled. The agency must 
consider the owner's presentation. The agency 
must update its appraisal if the owner's information 
or any material change in the character or the 
condition of the property indicates the need for 
a new appraisal, or if there has been a significant 
delay since the time the appraisal was completed. 
The agency cannot advance the time of condem­
nation or take any other coercive action to induce 
a settlement by the owner.1 2 
The type of appraisal that must be obtained by 
the agency is determined by the complexity of the 
appraisal problem.13 The appraisal must conform 
to minimum standards set by each agency and 
with commonly accepted appraisal practice if the 
appraisal does not require an in-depth analysis.14 
If an in-depth analysis is required, a detailed 
appraisal must be performed that conforms to 
nationally recognized appraisal standards including, 
if appropriate, the U niform Acquisition Standards for 
Federal Land Acquisition .15 At a minimum a detailed 
appraisal must include16 
1 .  The purpose and/or function of the appraisal, 
a description of the estate being appraised, and 
a statement of the assumptions and limiting 
conditions affecting the appraisal; 
2 .  An accurate description of the physical 
characteristics of the property (and any 
remainder if a partial taking will occur) , 
a statement of known and observed 
encumbrances, if any, title information, location,  
zoning, present use, an analysis of highest an d 
best use, and at least a five-year sales history 
of the property; 
3.  A description of all relevant and reliable 
approaches to value used consistent with 
commonly accepted appraisal practice (market 
data, income or replacement cost) . If more than 
one approach is used, there must be an analysis 
and reconciliation of approaches to value; 
4.  A description of  comparable sales, including 
the parties to the transaction, source and 
method of fi nancing and verification by the 
parties involved ; 
5. A statement of the value of the real property to 
be acquired, and if a partial taking is proposed, 
a statement of the damages and benefits, if any, 
to the remain der; and 
6. The effective date of the appraisal, signature 
and certification of the appraiser. 
The appraiser is required, to the extent permitted 
by applicable law, to disregard any decrease or 
increase in the fair market value of the property 
caused by the project for which the property is 
being acquired or by the likelihood that the property 
would be acquired for the project, other than due to 
physical deterioration within the reasonable control 
of the owner. 17 
Once the appraisal is completed, the agency must 
have the appraisal reviewed by a review appraiser.18 
The review appraiser must examine the appraisal to 
assure that it meets all applicable requirements, and 
must seek any necessary corrections. The review 
appraiser then either approves the appraisal or 
develops a new appraisal consistent with the 
above requirements. 
Before the agency can require the owner to 
surrender possession of the real property, the owner 
must be paid the agreed upon purchase price, or 
if no agreement has been reached, deposit with 
the court an amount not less than the approved 
appraisal for the fair market value of the property, 
or the amount of the court's award of compensation 
in the condemnation action .  I n  exceptional 
circumstances the agency can obtain a right-of-
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entry for construction purposes prior to making the  
payment availab le to  the owner. 19 
Although the pub lic agency may n ot pay Less 
than the approved purchase pri ce, as determined 
by its review appraiser, it may, under ce rtain 
circumstances, make an offer of settlement 
in excess of that amount.  In arriving at 
a determination to make an  admin istrative 
settlement, the agency should take the fo llowing 
factors into consideration : 20 
1. The appraiser's opi nion of value ;  
2 .  Any recent court awa rds for simi la r  
type property; 
3. The esti mated tria l  costs; and  
4 .  Valuation problems with  the property 
in question .  
The  agency is  required to  reimburse property 
owners fo r recording fees, transfer taxes, and  
si mi lar costs i ncidental to conveying rea l  property, 
penalty costs fo r prepayment of any pre-existing 
recordi ng mortgage, entered into in  good faith, 
encumbering the property and the p ro rata portion 
of rea l property taxes paid by the  owner which a re 
a llocable to a period subsequent to the date of title 
vesting with the agency or the effecti ve date of 
possession of the property by the agency, which ever 
is ea rlier. 2 1 
The owner is a lso entitled to be rei mbursed for his 
reasonab le expenses inc luding attorney, appraisal, 
and engineering fees actua lly i n curred because 
of a condem nation proceeding if: (1) the court 
determines that the  agency can not acquire the 
p roperty in question ; (2) the condemnation case 
is abandoned by the agency other than under an 
agreed upon settlement; or  (3) the court havi ng 
jurisdiction rendering a judgment in favor of the 
owner in an inverse condemnation case o r  the 
agency settles such a case.22 
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Form 1 
PETITIO N FO R CO N D EM NATIO N  
Petitioner ______ respectfu lly states as fo llows : 
1 .  Petitioner is a m u ni cipali ty and  pub lic corporation of the state of Tennessee and  has the power 
of condemnation a nd  eminent domain  fo r pub li c  purposes when publi c  convenience req ui res it pursua nt to 
______ (i nsert cha rter or p rivate a ct section) . This petiti on is fi led pursuant to Tennessee Code 
Annotated, Section  29 - 17-801 et seq . ,  (or 29-16-101 et seq . ,  if jury of vi ew procedure i s  used )  to acqui re 
certain prope rty ri ghts for the comp letion  of (i dentify project) with specific authority as  set 
out in ( identify ordi nance or resoluti on auth orizi ng condemnation for project) . 
2 .  The property rig hts sought to be acqui red are part of the property rig hts in rea l  estate Located 
in the (identify civi L distri ct) District of County, Tennessee, conveyed to 
______ ( insert owner's na me) from (insert i m m ediate predecessor i n  title ) of record 
in Book  , Page , Register's Office for County,  Tennessee .  The 
aforementioned property bei ng descri bed more particu la rly as fo llows : 
[Insert descri ption]  
Al l  as more particu la rly shown on the d rawing o r  map attached hereto as Exhi bit ____ _ 
3 .  Petiti oner has determi ned that respondent(s) owns the enti re fee si mp le i nte rest of the above­
descri bed rea l estate, subject to the encum bra n ces set out below: 
[ Li st encum brances] 
4. Petiti oner has determined the am ount to whi ch the respondent(s) is entitled is $ , and 
said amount is deposited with the c lerk of the cou rt. 
5 .  [Add if  jury of view is  used] Petitioner has fi led this petition for the purpose of obtai n ing the 
i ssuance of a writ  of inqui ry of dam ages and  the a ppoi ntment of a jury of view pursua nt to Tennessee Code 
Annotated, Section '2 9 - 16-101  et seq .  
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WH EREFORE , premises considered, petitioner  prays : 
1 .  T hat a hea ring  be had i n  this matte r on a n  ea rly date and at the hea ri ng ,  petiti one r  receive the rig ht to 
possession and ,  if necessary, a writ of possessi on issue to the Sheriff of County to put the 
petitioner i n  possession ,  and  
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[or  if ju ry of  vi ew proced ure is requested] 
1 .  That a hea ri ng  be he ld on this matter on an ea rly date and at that heari ng  the  court issue a 
writ of inquiry of dam ages and appoi nt a j u ry of vi ew. 
2. That an Order of Reference be entered to determi ne the amou nt of taxes due petitioner on  
sa id  p roperty and  said a mount to  be  pai d to  petitioner, and 
3 .  T h at a ll additiona l  proceedi ngs be had  i n  th is  matter and  at  th e fina l  heari ng  of th is  ca use, 
petitioner, its successors and assi gns, be decreed the property interests set out above , 
4. T h at petiti oner  have any and  a ll additiona l  re li ef to which it i s  entitled i n cludi n g  the 
assessment of costs as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated, Section  29- 1 7-812 .  
Respectfully submitted, 
Counse l  fo r Petitione r, 
City/T own of ______ �� __ 
Cost Bond 
(Requirements for cost bond language varies by j urisdi cti on )  
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Form 2A 
SERVICE BY SH ERIFF 
To ( identify name  and  address of respondents)  
NOTICE 
Ta ke NOTICE that on the day of , 20_, Petitioner  fi led a 
petition i n  this court a gai nst you ,  prayi ng  for the con demnation of property rig hts i n  the rea l  estate fu lly 
descri bed i n  the petiti on ,  a copy of which acco m pan ies this NOTICE. You a re further notified that said 
petition wi ll be presented to the court fo r heari n g  at 9 a . m .  on the day of , 20_, 
in the Ci rcuit Court, to determ ine  whether petitioner  s hou ld be g ra nted an o rder  of possessi on ,  entitli n g  it to 
i m mediate possession of the property rig hts described in the petition . 
You m ust p lead ,  a n swer, o r  except to the petition  as p rovided by law, or a j udg ment wi ll be ta ken as 
confessed agai nst you a nd  the matter proceeded with as provided by law.  
( Include fo llowi n g  two paragraphs  if usi n g  bu lldozer/quick take procedure) 
You a re furthe r  notified , pu rsuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29 -1 7-803,  that after the expi ration  
of  five days from the d ate of givi n g  of  th i s  NOTICE,  if the petitio ner's ri ght to  con dem n a nd  acquire the 
p roperty ri ghts descri bed in the petition  is  not questi oned o r  contested by written forma l  objection fi led with 
the clerk of this cou rt a nd served upon the petitioner's attorney, the petiti oner  sha ll h ave the ri ght to ta ke 
possessio n  of the property ri ghts soug ht. If necessary to p lace the petiti oner in possessio n  thereof, the court 
sha ll issue a Writ of Possession  to the Sh eriff of County to put the petitioner  in possession of 
the property ri g hts . 
If you desi re to contest the taki n g  by condem n ation  un der the laws of emi nent domain ,  you m ust 
a ppear at the ti me desi g nated after h avi ng  fi led your  written forma l  objecti on .  If you fai l  to a ppear or choose 
not to a ppear, an Order of Possession wi ll be entered g ra nted to the petitioner  the property rig hts described .  
Th i s  hea ri ng ,  however, wi ll n ot be con cerned with the va lue of you r  property o r  you r  i nterest therei n a n d  wi ll 
not be concerned with the j ust com pensation  to which you a re entitled . 
This  ___ day of _______ , 20 __ . 
8y _________________ _ 
Ci rcuit Court Clerk Deputy C lerk 
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O FFICER'S RETU RN 
I certify that I served this NOTICE with a copy of the Petition for Condem nation ,  upon servi n g  the 
above-named respondent(s) ,  by personally deliveri ng  a copy to sai d respondent(s ) ,  this day of 
_____ , 20 __ _ 
SHERIFF OF  _ ______ COU NTY, TEN N ESS EE 
By ________ �--------------------
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SERVICE BY MAIL 
To (identify name and  address of respondents) 
N OTICE 
Take NOTICE that on the day of , 20_, Petiti oner  _____ _ 
filed a petition i n  this court again st you, prayi ng  fo r the condemnation  of property ri ghts i n  the rea l  estate 
fu lly descri bed i n  the petition ,  a copy of which accompa nies this NOTICE .  You are fu rther notified that said 
petiti on wi ll be presented to the court fo r a hea ri n g  at 9 a. m .  on the day of , 20 __ , 
in the Ci rcuit Cou rt, to determine whether petitio ner s hou ld be granted a n  order of possession ,  entitli ng  it to 
im medi ate possession of the property ri g hts described in the petition . 
You must plead, answer, or except to the petition as provided by law, or a judgment wi ll be taken as 
provided by law.  
( Inc lude the fo llowi ng  two paragraphs  if  usi ng  bu lldozer/quick ta ke procedure) 
You are fu rther n otified,  pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29- 17-803 , that after the expi ration  
of  five days from the date of the  giving  of  th i s  NOTICE, if the  petitio ner's ri ght to condemn  and  acquire the 
property ri ghts descri bed i n  the petitio n  is not questioned or contested by written fo rmal  objection  fi led with 
the c lerk of th is court and  served upon the petiti oner's atto rney, the petitioner shall have the ri g ht to ta ke 
possession  of the property ri ghts soug ht. If necessa ry to pLace the petitioner  in possession  thereof, the court 
shall issue a Writ of Possessi on  to the Sheriff  of Cou nty to put the petiti oner in possessi on of 
his property ri ghts . 
If you desi re to contest the ta ki ng by co ndemnation under the laws of eminent domai n ,  you must 
appear at the ti me designated afte r havi ng fi led your written formal  objecti o n .  If you fai l  to appear or choose 
not to appear, an  O rder of Possessi on wi ll be entered g ranti ng  to the petitioner  the property ri ghts descri bed. 
Thi s heari ng ,  however, wi ll n ot be co ncerned with the value of your property or  your interest therei n and wi ll 
not be concerned with the just compensation to which you are entitled . 
This  ___ day of _______ , 20 __ . 
Ci rcuit Court Clerk 
By ____________________ _ 
Deputy C lerk 
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CERTI FICATE O F  SERVICE 
This is to certify that this NOTICE  and a copy of the Petiti on for Condemnati on has been mailed to all 
respondents, by u .s. Certified M ail, this day of , 20 _ 0  
Attorney for Petiti oner 
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Form 3 
M OTIO N FO R N OTICE BY PU B LICATION 
Petitioner  pursuant to Ru le 4 .05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Tennessee Code Annotated §§  29-16-105 and 21-1-203, respectfu Lly m oves for an  Order that noti ce of the 
Petition for Condem nation fi led herei n upon  the respondents, , be made by publi cati on  
and  for g rounds states that t he  residence o f  these respondents is unknown and cannot be  ascertai ned upon 
di ligent i n quiry. Petiti oner relies on  the affidavit of its counsel of record , , fi led herewith 
i n  su pport of this m otion .  
Respectfu lly submitted, 
Attorney for Petitioner  
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AFFIDAVIT OF  _____ _ (CITY ATTORN EY) 
State of Ten nessee 
Cou nty of ______ _ 
I ,  ______ , bei n g fi rst du ly sworn , state as fo llows : 
1 .  Affiant  is a prope rly li censed attorn ey i n  the state of Ten nessee and  is the attorney for the 
petition er, , in this case. 
2 .  Affia nt states that the property rights sought a re part of certai n property known as 
________ (descri be property) .  
3 .  Affi ant states th at he  h a s  made n u merous i nqui ri es a n d  has obta ined a n  extensive title search i n  
attempts to locate the respon dent(s ) ,  . A copy of  that  title search is  attached he reto as 
Exhi bit A .  
4. Affiant states that he has made  a di li gent effort to locate the ( n ames/add resses) of  the  
respondent(s) and  has been unsuccessfu l. 
FU RTH ER, A FFIANT SAITH NOT. 
Sworn to and subscri bed before me a N ota ry Publi c, this ____ d ay of ________ , 20 __ . 
Notary Publi c  
My Com mission  Expi res _______ _ 
Form 5 
ORDER O F  PU BLICATION 
It a ppeari n g  to the court from the affi davit of , attorney for th e petitio ner, that 
respondent(s) , , a re ( u n known or non-residents of the County of a nd  the 
state of Ten nessee) and ordi na ry servi ce of process can not be had upon them ;  
I t  is  ORDERED ,  that pub li cation  o f  this o rder  be  made  for fou r  consecutive weeks i n  the 
___ -'--___ , ( specify newspaper) a newspaper pub lished i n  County, Ten nessee, 
notifyi ng  the respondent(s ) ,  , that  they a re requi red to  a nswer to  m a ke defense to  the  
Petiti on for Condem n ation  i n  the office of the Ci rcuit Court C lerk of County, Ten nessee, 
withi n  30 days after the fou rth weekly pub li cation  of this order a nd  that, upon thei r fai lu re to do so, the 
Petiti on  for Condem nation  wi ll be ta ken as admitted by them and the case set - for  heari n g  without thei r 
p resence .  
Approved fo r Entry 
Ci rcuit Court J udge Attorney for Petitio ner 




O R D E R  O F  POSSESSIO N  
This cause was heard on the day of , 20 __ , to determi ne whether 
the petitioner should be granted possession of the respondents' property. Based upon the pLeadi ngs, exhibits, 
as well as the entire record, 
IT IS TH E REFORE O R D E R E D  by the court that petitioner have and receive title and possession to the 
property rights sought to be condemned, and that a Writ of Possession issue, if necessary, in order to put 
petiti oner in possession of said property, being more particularly described as follows : 
[i nsert legal description of property being acquired] 
IT IS FU RTH E R  O RD E R E D, ADJ U DG E D , and DECRE E D  that this matter be referred to the clerk of the 
court to determi ne past due and unpaid county/municipal taxes which are a lien upon said property. 
The clerk of this court will make out and certify to the petitioner, ______ , a copy of thi s 
Order of Possession.  
ALL FU RTH E R  MATTERS ARE R ES E RV E D .  
ENTE R E D  this _____ day of ____ , 20_ . 
Approved for Entry 
Circuit Court Judge Attorney for Petitioner 
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ORDER SUSTAINING PETITIO N 
FOR CON DEM NATION AN D ORDERING  WRIT OF  INQUIRY 
This case ca me on to be heard on the day of , 20 __ , before the 
Honorab le , J udge of the Circuit Co urt of Cou nty, 
Ten nessee, upon the Petiti on for Co ndem nation and  Notice th ereof to respon dents .  It appeari n g  to the 
court that said petiti on and  notice have been served, or publication made, as requi red by law, a nd  that said 
cause i s  before the court on app lication  to sustai n  a petition and  for a writ of i nqui ry of damages a nd  the 
appoi ntment of a j u ry of vi ew; a nd  it further appeari ng  that the respondents are befo re the court a nd  that 
petitioner  has the lega l  power and authority to acquire [i nsert herein the i nterest sought to be condem ned] 
under th e emi nent domain  laws of the state of Tennessee to the fo llowing  descri bed property located in 
_____ County, Ten nessee: 
[i nsert herei n a descri ption of the property] 
Respondents' right  of tria l  by petit j u ry to determine the amount of compensation to which they are entitled 
fo r this ta ki ng  is not affected by the tra nsfer of title to petitioner. 
IT IS O RDERED , ADJ U DGED, and  DECREED :  
1 .  That the Petiti on fo r Co ndemnation of  the  herei nabove descri bed property be  and  the same is 
hereby sustai ned . 
2 .  That the fo llowi ng persons a re nominated and appoi nted to act as a Jury of View as provided by 
the emin ent domai n  laws of Tennessee: 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
Alternate : 
3 .  That the c lerk sha ll issue a writ of i nquiry to the sheriff commanding  hi m to sum mons sai d Jury of 
Vi ew to appea r i n  open court on the day of , 20 __ , at , a nd  
no other fu rther  noti ce thereof need be  given ,  there to be  impaneled and  sworn , after wh i ch  they wi ll proceed 
im mediate ly to the property soug ht to be con demned and exa mine it, h ear testi mony of witn esses, but no 
argu ment of counsel, and  set apa rt by metes and bo unds the la nd to be co ndem ned, and  assess damages as 
requi red by law, red uce their report to writi ng and deliver the same to the sheriff, who wi ll make his retu rn 
thereof to the court. 
This  ______ day of _____ , 20 __ . 
Approved for Entry 
Ci rcuit Court Judge Atto rney fo r Petitioner 
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WRIT O F  I N QUIRY 
St ate of Ten nessee 
Cou nty of _______ _ 
TO TH E SH ERI FF OF  ________ COUNTY, TEN N ESSEE  
A pet iti on h as b een fi led i n  t he  Circuit Court o f  ________ Cou nty, Tennessee, f or t he 
condem nat ion  of cert ai n r ights descr ibed fu lly i n  sai d pet iti on .  
Now, th erefor e, a s  pr ovi ded by th e emi nent domai n  laws of th e st at e of  Ten nessee, you are her eby 
c om manded to  su mmon  th e fo llowi ng t o  act as  a Jury of  View and to  appear on  th e day of 
________, 20 __ , at o'c lock i n  open c ourt i n  th e Circu it Cou rt of 
_______ Cou nty, Ten nessee, at [i n sert herei n  the p lace  where  th e c ourt sits ] : 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5. 
A lter nat ive: 
The Jury of View wi ll be swor n a nd  i n structed,  and  wi ll go i m mediate ly to th e pr emises, h ear t he 
test imony of wit nesses, but no  argu ment of cou nsel, and set apart by metes and  b ou nds  th e pr operty to  b e  
c ondem ned, a n d  i n qu ir e  a n d  assess t he damag es r esu lti ng fr om this t ak i ng ,  a n d  report it s fi nd ing s  i n  writ i ng 
by each member of th e Jury of View or a m ajor ity of t hem,  which r eport sha ll be  del iver ed to  you and by you 
r etur ned t o  thi s court . 
I N  WI TN ESS W H E REOF, I h ave h er eu nto  set my hand and seal of t hi s  c ourt on the ____ day of 
_______, 20 __ . 
[i nsert her ei n  th e name of t he c lerk of c ourt ] 
By 
(Clerk or Deputy Clerk ) 
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REPO RT O F  TH E J U RY O F  VI EW 
We, the J ury of View, su m mo ned, appoi nted and sworn , as provided by the laws of the state of 
Tennessee, and  by orders of the court heretofore made and entered in this proceeding were di rected to lay 
off by metes a n d  bounds  the property i nterests herei n con dem ned ,  and to inqu i re a n d  assess dam ages to the 
property i nterest ta ken by Petiti oner . We hereby report as fo llows: 
We went upon the property condem ned herein on the day of 
_________, 20 __ , and exa mined said property by persona l  inspection a nd  heard evidence,  
but no arg um ent of counsel, of the va Lue of the property i nterests to be condemned, and  we do  hereby a llot 
and  set a pa rt to the petitioner, property situated i n  County, Tennessee, and described as 
fo llows: 
[insert herei n a description of the property ta ken] 
And we do  fi n d  the fai r  cash value of the property herei n condem ned as  bei ng $ _____ , a nd  
that this sum consists of t h e  fo llowi ng amounts : 
Fai r ma rket value of land taken ------
______ Incidenta l  damages 
The mem bers of the Ju ry of View met on the following  dates and respectfu LLy request a fee for each . 
Dates 
This ____ day of _________ , 20  __ , 
Mem bers of the Ju ry of Vi ew 
Received from the Ju ry of Vi ew and returned to the c lerk of the court thi s _____ d ay of 
________, 20�_. 
Sheri ff of ___________ County 
By Deputy Sheriff 
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O R D E R  CON FI RM I N G  REPO RT OF TH E J U RY O F  VI EW 
It a ppea ring  to the court that the Ju ry of View having  met and  reported to the court that the fai r  cas h  
value of the property ri ghts co ndem ned herei n i s  $ (Optiona l: i n cludi ng  i n cidenta l  damages to the 
resi due of $ ___ , )  and (Optiona l: i f  deposit made by petitioner, _ , having  deposited with 
the  clerk of this court the sum of $ ) .  
I t  i s  therefore ORDERED, ADJ U DG ED ,  a n d  D ECREED :  
1 .  That the report of the Ju ry of  View i s  confirmed both as to the  appropriation  of the  p roperty ri g hts 
con dem ned a nd  the award of damages resu lti ng from the taking ,  and  that petiti oner, _____ _ 
upon paym ent to the c lerk for the use of respondents the amount of damages a ssessed by the J u ry of Vi ew 
a nd a ll costs of this cause, is adjudged to have acquired the fo llowing descri bed p roperty : 
[i nsert herei n a descri ption of  the property ri g hts being  con dem ned] 
and that the property rights th us a cqui red and possession  thereof i s  hereby divested out of respo ndents a nd  
vested i n  petiti oner, , a n d  a ny other liens  or encumbran ces fo r taxes or the c lai m of a ny 
party he reto are transferred to the funds herei n deposited o r  secured . 
2 .  That respondents [i nsert herei n the name  or names of a ll respon dents] , have and  recover of 
petitioner the sum of $ the same being  the fai r cash value of the property rig hts ta ken,  for which 
petitioner has  heretofore paid i nto this  cou rt the sum of $ ___ _ 
3. That respondents a re entitled to i nterest at the rate of 10  percent per a n num  on the a mount of 
$ , that being  the difference between the $ , deposited as tender a n d  the Jury of View award ,  
from t h e  date o f  taki ng ,  [i n sert herei n t h e  date o f  taki ng ] , unti l  sai d s u m  i s  pai d i nto court .  
4. That  the members of the Ju ry of  Vi ew be pa id  the sum of  $ each for thei r  services i n  this 
cause,  the same to be paid to the c lerk of this cou rt by petitioner  as part of the costs in  this cause and that 
the clerk s h a ll distri bute sa me to the mem bers of the ju ry .  
5. That this cause be referred to the  c lerk for a determi nation  of  the  taxes which constitute a lien  on  
sai d property in  a ccord a n ce with Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 26-5-108(b ) . 
This the ____ day of ____ 20 __ 
Approved for Entry 
Ci rcuit Court Judge Atto rn ey fo r Petiti oner 
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APPEAL FROM FIN DING  OF TH E J U RY OF  VIEW 
Petition er, , excepts to the fi ndi ng  and  report of the J ury of Vi ew that 
the fai r  cash va lue of the property ri ghts condem ned herei n is $ , a nd  hereby appea ls such 
findi n g  and  requests a tri a l  befo re a petit ju ry i n  the usua l  way, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, 
Section  29-16-118 .  
By  ________________________ __ 
Atto rney fo r Petiti oner 
I am  su rety for costs not to exceed $ _______ __ 
By . __________________________ _ 
Attorney fo r Petitioner  
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N OTICE OF DISM ISSA L 
Comes to the petitio ner, pu rsuant to Rule 41 . 01  of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and  fi les this 
notice of volunta ry dismissal as to the Respondent ______ _ 
Respectfu lly submitted ,  
Attorney for Petitioner 
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O R D E R  OF DIS M ISSA L 
Petitione r, , having given notice of volunta ry dismissal pursua n t  to R u le 41 of the  
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure again st Respon dent ______ _ 
IT IS THE R E FO R E  O R DERED ,  A DJUDGED A N D DECREED that this case is hereby DISMISSED as against the 
respon d e nt, , and that the mon eys heretofore deposited into court shall  be refu nded to 
petitioner, minus the court costs. 
Entered this ______ day of _____ , 20_. 
A pproved for Entry 
Circuit Court J u dge Attorney for Petitioner  
--------�--------
Form 1 4  
AGREED FINAL ORDER 
This cause h avi ng  been com promised a n d  settLed,  a s  evidenced by the si g n atu res of counse l  for 
petitioner  and the sig n atu res of the respondents, a n d  the court bei ng  du ly and  sufficiently advised ; 
It is hereby ORDERED ,  ADJ U DG E D  and  D ECREED  by the cou rt that the respondents h ave a nd recover the 
s um  of $ the same  bei ng  the fai r  cash ma rket va Lue of the property descri bed herei nbeLow, [i n c luded 
if  usi n g  bu lldozer/quick take procedure] petitioner h avi n g  heretofore paid i nto court $ at the  ti me 
of fi Li n g  the Petition for Condemnati on .  
It i s  further  O R DE RED ,  ADJ U DGED  and  D ECREED  by  the  cou rt that a LL o f  t he  title t o  t he  property 
descri bed herei nbelow be, a n d  the sa me is hereby divested out of respondents and  a ll other persons clai m ing  
any adverse i nterest therei n a nd  hereby is vested i n  petitioner in fee si m p le, said property 
bei n g  more particu la rly described as fo llows: 
[descri ption of the p roperty] 
It further a ppeari n g  to the court th at the  p roperty he rei nabove described m ay be subject to lien  for 
taxes due, i nterest and  pena lty, if any, owin g  to ( cou nty a nd/or m u ni cipa lity in  
wh ich  property Located) and  i n  accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated, Section  26-5-108(b ) ,  the c lerk of 
the cou rt, pri or to the payment of any part of the j udg ment to respon dents sha ll ascertai n whether  there a re 
any taxes d ue and  un paid which a re lien upon said property, a nd  sha ll issue  to each of the offici a ls cha rged 
with the collection of any taxes which mig ht be a lien  on said property a statement, givi n g  the style a n d  
n u m ber of th is  ca use, a descri ption  of t h e  property, a nd  the name  of t h e  party out o f  whom  title ;s  divested; 
whereupon each of sai d offici a ls s ha ll certify to sai d c lerk an  itemized statement of taxes, i nterest a n d  
pen a lty, i f  any,  which were a lien u pon  said la nd  a s  o f  t h e  date o f  entry o f  this Ag reed Fi na l  Order. 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJ U DGED  a nd  D ECREED  that the c lerk i s  di rected to pay out of the money 
deposited by the petitioner  a ny un paid taxes that m ay be determ ined to be owi ng  by the above referen ces, 
a n d  the clerk sha LL pay a ny remain i ng  funds to the respondents . 
It is further ORDERED  by the court that the costs i n  this cause be a nd  the same  a re hereby taxed 
agai nst the petitioner  for which  execution  m ay issue if necessary. 
The clerk of this court wi ll m a ke out and certify to the petitioner, I a copy 
of this judgment together  with a cost b i ll for the lawfu l costs of this cause, for payment by the Petitioner  
Entered this _____ day of ____ , 20_. 
Approved for Entry 
Ci rcuit Court J udge Attorney for Petitioner  
Attorney for Respondents 
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PRETRI L CHECK LIST 
• Open office fi le .  
• Make sure procedures required under Re location 
Act have been complied with . 
• Bring title info rmation up to date. 
• Check to see which civi l district property 
i s  located . 
• Check whether taxes due require na ming taxi ng 
authority as party defendant. 
• Check whether tenants must be named as 
parties defenda nt. 
• Obtain aerial photograph  of subject property. 
• Obtain plan ning com mission p lat of 
subject property. 
• Obtain engi neer's drawing showing area of ta ki ng .  
• Estab lish tentative date of  ta king  and arrange 
with appraisers and photog rapher  for pretria l  
conference at site of property on date of taki ng .  
• Obtain project description for use  in  petition .  
• Draft petition .  
• Draft notice and ,  if necessa ry, order of  publication 
and supporting affidavit. 
• Draft order of condemnation and appropriation .  
• Proofread al l p leadi n g .  
• Fi le petition a nd  arrange for service. 
• Obtai n deposit receipt. 
• Prehearing ,  check on service of process .  
• Hearing to obtai n order of condemnation 
and appropriation .  
• Sign ing and entry of order of condemnation 
and  appropriation .  
• Fu rnish copy of order of condemnation and 
appropriation to adversary counsel .  
• Pretria l  conference at site of property with 
apprai ser; obtain photog raphs of subject property, 
i m mediate ly surround ing property, and  com parab le 
sa les ;  locate comparab le sa les on p lann ing 
commission map. 
• Request copies of adversary appraisa Ls .  
• Summarize for tria L  use a LL appraisaLs. 
• ExpLore settlement possibilities with 
adversary counse l. 
• Take any necessary depositions and fi le them 
with clerk. 
• Prepare pretriaL  brief as requi red or desired and 
requests for speciaL instructions . 
• Prepare all exhibits fo r use at tria l .  
• PretriaL conference with engi neeri ng witness, 
if any. 
• Pretrial  conference with j udge and 
adversary counsel. 
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• Draft fina l  judgment. 
• Proofread fina l  judgment. 
• Submit d raft fina l  j udgment for description  check .  
• Obtai n signatures to final  judgment and  see 
to entry. 
• Obtain statements from appraisers, court 
reporters, supp liers of exhibits, and  photograp hers .  
• Approve statements and submit for payment .  
• Obtain, review, and approve bill of costs . 
• Obtain instructions regardi ng appea l. 
• Obtain certified copy of fina l  judgment. 
4 
• Obtai n parcel number  for fi na l  judgment.  
• See to registration for final judgment. 
• Advance cost of registration of final judgment and  
obtai n receipt. 
• Forward certified copy of fina l  judgment  to 
appropriate officia l. 
• Pay judgment and  obtain receipt. 
• Pay costs and obtain receipt .  
• Prepare statement for services. 
• Close office fi le .  
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